The Supreme Court Needs a Mandatory and Enforceable Code of Ethics
SUMMARY
The City Bar, through its Rule of Law Task Force, Federal Courts Committee, Professional Responsibility Committee, and Professional Ethics Committee, asserts that Congress has the Constitutional authority to enact binding and enforceable ethics rules for the U.S. Supreme Court, and endorses the creation of a Judicial Investigation Panel and an Office of the Inspector General for the Supreme Court. Noting the lack of an enforcement mechanism in the voluntary Code of Conduct the Court announced in 2023, and listing recent revelations of repeated noncompliance with ethics rules by Justices that have pushed public confidence in the Court to a historic low, the City Bar urges Congress to assert its authority to set enforceable ethical guardrails on Justices’ behavior.
Read the full report here.
For an overview of the recommendations found in this report, please see the below resources:
Key Takeaways
Recommendations for Congress
Improving the 2023 Supreme Court Code of Conduct
RELATED BILL INFORMATION
S.359 (Sen. Whitehouse) – Supreme Court Ethics, Recusal, and Transparency Act of 2023 (118th Congress, 2023-24)
H.R. 8830 (Rep. Raskin) – High Court Gift Ban Act (118th Congress, 2023-24)
H.R. 8098 (Rep. Stansbury) – Judicial Ethics Enforcement Act of 2024 (118th Congress, 2023-24)
REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The need for Supreme Court Justices to comply with the highest ethical standards is a nonpartisan issue because, as the Supreme Court itself has emphasized, public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the courts is a bedrock principle of the rule of law. Impartial justice is embedded in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and is guaranteed through the interaction of the twin principles of separation of powers and checks and balances. Recognizing the imperative of guaranteeing impartial justice, all fifty states have enforceable judicial ethics codes—including those that bind their highest courts. When some of those codes have come before it, the Supreme Court has highlighted the singular importance of judicial codes of conduct to “maintain the integrity of the judiciary and the rule of law.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009). As it has explained:
Courts, in our system, elaborate principles of law in the course of resolving disputes. The power and the prerogative of a court to perform this function rest, in the end, upon the respect accorded to its judgments. The citizen’s respect for judgments depends in turn upon the issuing court’s absolute probity. Judicial integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of the highest order.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Based on this reasoning, the Court found that the judicial ethics codes of both Florida and West Virginia serve a “compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.” Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015); Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889–90. This is the nonpartisan point of ethics reform: mandatory and enforceable ethics rules enhance judicial integrity. As Senator Grassley put it in introducing a bill to create an independent watchdog for the courts in 2017, an enforceable system of regulation would “keep [the Court] beyond reproach, [and] it will strengthen our judicial branch.”[1]
This report embraces the goal of setting a system of regulation that will keep the Court beyond reproach and presents a proposal for doing that. It proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the ethical standards that currently apply to the Supreme Court, past concerns about their sufficiency and effectiveness, and existing reform proposals. It traces the development of principles governing judicial ethics in this country generally and Congress’s enactment of laws governing recusal and ethics that apply to the Supreme Court specifically. While many Justices over the years have cited these laws as governing their behavior, in 2011, Chief Justice John Roberts questioned, cautiously but pointedly, the constitutionality of these laws. Although he said that the Justices all comply with the law, he nonetheless observed, “[t]he Court has never addressed whether Congress may impose those requirements on the Supreme Court.” [2] This comment cast some doubt on the Court’s willingness to accept the ethical requirements Congress imposes by law and this concern has been exacerbated by the 2023 Code of Conduct, which seemingly ignores some provisions of the long-standing laws enacted specifically to govern the Justices’ ethical and recusal obligations.
Part II addresses the constitutionality of reform legislation. Although the issue has never been litigated, we find no substantial reason to doubt Congress’s ability to legislate in this area. We recognize the separation of powers, but also that we have a system of checks and balances in which Congress plays a significant role. Obligations to provide impartial justice are embedded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In 1789, Congress created the Judicial Oath, requiring all Justices to swear to “do equal right to the poor and to the rich” and “faithfully and impartially” discharge the duties of the office—the Nation’s first judicial ethics code. Congress has more recently regulated in this area, enacting both 28 U.S.C. § 455, governing recusals, and the Ethics in Government Act, 5 U.S.C. § 13101, governing receipt and disclosure of gifts. Both apply explicitly to Supreme Court Justices and have never been questioned in any ruling by any court. Congress’s power to act comes from the interplay of three provisions in the Constitution: Article I’s Necessary and Proper Clause, Article II’s impeachment provision, and Article III’s provision that a judge may remain in office only during “good Behaviour.”
In Part III, we analyze the 2023 Supreme Court Code of Conduct and address what we view as its shortcomings, most notably the absence of mandatory and enforceable standards and deficiencies relating to its treatment of gifts and recusal. As Justice Jackson recently stated, “[p]eople are entitled to know if you’re accepting gifts as a judge, so that they can evaluate whether or not your opinions are impartial.”[3] We recommend addressing the current public concerns over extravagant and unreported gifts to Justices from “friends,” especially gifts labeled “social hospitality,” by imposing limits on such gift-giving. Our annual proposed limit is $1000, a generous amount in our eyes, but small in comparison to reported cash gifts of well over $100,000 and lavish travel to faraway locations. In addition, there is now no reporting obligation for social hospitality. We would require reporting of gifts of social hospitality valued at over $480, the current cutoff for disclosing other gifts.
Part III also discusses the proper standards for recusal and criticizes the Supreme Court’s 2023 Code of Conduct for failing to acknowledge the Court’s obligation to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 455, a law that requires recusal when a Justice’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Under the statute, the balance in close cases must tilt towards recusal, but the Court’s 2023 Code of Conduct tilts the balance decidedly against recusal. Relying on principles that contradict its own decisions, the Court cites the “duty to sit” and “the time-honored rule of necessity” as two reasons to decline to recuse.[4] In fact, Congress eliminated the relevance of any “duty to sit” to the recusal analysis through a 1974 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 455. As Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged, that amendment “had the effect of removing the so-called ‘duty to sit’.” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 871 (1988) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). And the rule of necessity means only that a judge must sit if no other judge is available to decide a case. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213 (1980); see also McLaughlin v. Mont. State Legislature, 489 P.3d 482, 488 (Mont. 2021). It is not a reason for one Justice to sit when his or her “impartiality might reasonably be questioned” so long as at least six other judges—a quorum for the Court[5]—are available. The rule of necessity, like the duty to sit, does not in our view play any proper role in a recusal decision about an individual Justice, particularly when that Justice would cast the deciding vote.
Finally, in Part IV, we address the need for an enforcement mechanism. We propose a solution derived from several pending bills and the public comments of Justice Kagan. Justice Kagan suggested that a panel of lower court judges enforce the Code, and not the Court itself, because she worried about the effect on collegiality of Justices sitting in judgment of each other.[6] We recommend enforcement be left largely to two new entities: a Judicial Investigation Panel (sometimes referred to herein as the “Judicial Panel”) composed of five federal judges, as suggested by Justice Kagan, and an Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”), a bipartisan proposal first advocated by Senator Grassley a decade ago. Under our approach, the Judicial Investigation Panel would screen complaints to identify those meriting investigation; the OIG would be authorized to investigate only those complaints referred by the Judicial Investigation Panel. This bifurcation ensures that the OIG will not embark on investigations for partisan ends, and prevents so-called “agency capture” by requiring the OIG to investigate referred matters. After an investigation, we propose that the OIG report back to the Judicial Investigation Panel, which would rule on any potential ethical violations. We believe the disinterested Justices on the Supreme Court should have the right to have the last word, but we propose minimizing the risk that it would create internal tensions on the Court by providing that the decision of the Judicial Investigation Panel would become final thirty days after its issuance unless the Supreme Court acts to modify or reverse it.
We propose that recusal issues be handled in a similar manner. This reform will address a major concern with current Supreme Court practice: allowing each Justice to assess whether their own impartiality “might” reasonably be questioned and decide alone whether to recuse, with no independent review by anyone. The Chief Justice explains this current practice: “The Supreme Court does not sit in judgment of one of its own Members’ decisions whether to recuse in the course of deciding a case. . . . There is no higher court to review a Justice’s decision not to recuse in a particular case.”[7] In our view, this violates a bedrock principle of Anglo-American law. “[A] law that makes a man a judge in his own cause . . . is against all reason and justice . . . .” Caldor v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.).[8]
Our recusal proposal, modeled on legislation proposed by Senator Whitehouse, authorizes the OIG to investigate the facts when a suggestion of recusal is raised, either through a complaint to the Judicial Investigation Panel or on a motion for recusal made to the Court. A Justice can decide to recuse by him or herself but cannot decide alone to decline a properly presented request for recusal. When the issue of recusal is presented and the Justice does not recuse, after investigation of the underlying facts by the OIG, the Judicial Investigation Panel would decide whether to grant or deny the recusal request. Its decision, again, would become final unless the Supreme Court elects to review for itself the Judicial Investigation Panel’s decision.
For ease of reference, an Appendix to this report contains a list of the specific reforms we propose with cross-cites to the report itself.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (3)
I. The Need for Supreme Court Ethics Reform (8)
A. Development of Judicial Ethics (8)
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- Congressional legislation (9)
- Codes of conduct (15)
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B. Recurring Issues: A Brief History of Controversial Gifts and Recusals (17)
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- Controversies over gifts and financial disclosure (17)
- Controversies over recusals (19)
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C. The Current Controversy About Supreme Court Ethics (23)
D. The Supreme Court 2023 Code of Conduct (30)
E. The Supreme Court’s Reputation Suffers as the Controversies Continue (32)
II. Congress’s Power To Set Ethics Rules for the Supreme Court (37)
A. The Necessary and Proper Clause Empowers Congress to Enact Ethics Standards for the Supreme Court (38)
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- The Supreme Court has interpreted the Necessary and Proper Clause broadly (39)
- The Supreme Court has read the Necessary and Proper Clause broadly in cases involving the Court (41)
- The Supreme Court has recognized that judicial ethics codes serve a compelling state interest (45)
- The Impeachment Power and the Good Behavior Clause permit Congress to enact ethics legislation as a check on Supreme Court behavior (47)
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B. The Separation of Powers Does Not Prohibit Congressional Enactment of a Supreme Court Ethics Code (52)
C. The Constitution Permits the Removal of Supreme Court Jurisdiction to Review a Congressional Code of Ethics for the Justices (60)
III. Improving The 2023 Supreme Court Code of Conduct (65)
A. The Need for Congressional Action (65)
B. The City Bar Proposal: Gifts and Social Hospitality (66)
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- The legal framework (66)
- Gifts (68)
- Social hospitality (74)
- Improvements to existing law (80)
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C. The City Bar Proposal: Recusal (83)
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- The Court’s existing code contradicts binding law about when recusal is mandatory (84)
- Nothing about the Court’s broad authority requires different recusal rules (90)
a. The Rule of Necessity does not apply when there is a quorum (90)
b. The duty to sit has no place in the recusal analysis (93)
c. Unbiased justice is more important than having nine justices (96) - Improved disclosure rules will enhance recusal decisions (101)
- Amicus briefs that would cause a recusal if submitted by a party should be rejected by the Court (102)
- Justices should divest publicly traded stocks (102)
- Justices should ordinarily explain recusal decisions (104)
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IV. Enforcement (106)
A. Other Enforcement Systems (109)
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- State court enforcement systems (109)
- Executive branch Inspectors General (111)
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B. The City Bar Proposal: Ethical Violations (114)
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- Screening complaints by the Judicial Panel (114)
- Investigating complaints by the OIG (116)
- Appointment authority, removal authority, and term limits (117)
- Adjudication and discipline (121)
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C. The City Bar Proposal: Recusal (123)
CONCLUSION (129)
APPENDIX (131)
RECOMMENDATIONS (131)
Read the full report here.
Footnotes
[1] 161 Cong. Rec. S3240 (2015) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley).
[2] Supreme Court of the United States, 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 6, https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf (hereinafter “2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary”).
[3] Callie Teitelbaum, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson on Supreme Court Ethics and the Future of the Court, CBS News (Sept. 1, 2024), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-ketanji-brown-jackson-on-supreme-court-ethics-and-the-future-of-the-court/.
[4] Code of Conduct for Justices of the Supreme Court of the U.S., Supreme Court 2 (Nov. 13, 2023), https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/Code-of-Conduct-for-Justices_November_13_2023.pdf (hereinafter “SCOTUS Code”).
[5] 28 U.S.C. § 1.
[6] Marimow, supra note 4.
[7] 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary at 8.
[8] See also, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 329 n.* (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Bonham’s Case for the “wisdom” of the “ancient maxim,” ‘aliquis non debet esse Judex in propria causa’—no man ought to be a judge of his own cause”); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Bonham’s Case, 8 Co. 114a, 118a, 77 Eng.Rep. 646, 652 (1610), for the “first principle” that “[N]o man shall be a judge in his own cause”).