The Ceasing Repeated and Extremely Egregious Predatory Behavior Act (CREEP Act)

SUMMARY

With input from the Children and the Law Committee (Laura Diewald and Amy Hozer-Weber, Co-Chairs), Civil Rights Committee (Evan Henley, Co-Chair), Corrections and Community Reentry Committee (Karen Adelman and Paul Montouri, Co-Chairs), Criminal Courts Committee (Eric S. Fieldman and Jeffrey D. Linehan, Co-Chairs), Criminal Justice Operations Committee (James A. Aliaga, Chair), Family Court and Family Law Committee (Liberty Aldrich and Monica Shah, Co-Chairs), and the Sex Offense Working Group (Alex Lesman, Chair), the City Bar sent a letter to Governor Hochul on S.3394-A / A.3226-A, the Ceasing Repeated and Extremely Egregious Predatory (CREEP) Behavior Act. While acknowledging the problem the bill seeks to address, the letter conveys serious legal concerns with the bill as currently drafted—particularly around due process and consequences for minors and other vulnerable populations. “We believe chapter amendments are needed if the bill is going to be signed into law to ensure that a law intended to prevent harassment does not, in turn, become a vehicle for harassment.” The letter describes the concerns – including absence of appointed counsel, timing and adequacy of hearings on temporary orders, absence of a minimum age requirement, collateral consequences for vulnerable populations, First Amendment and overbreadth concerns, and structural/implementation concerns – and provides recommendations that could help overcome some of the legal infirmities of the bill.

REPORT

June 22, 2026

Hon. Kathy Hochul
Governor of the State of New York
New York State Capitol Building
Albany, NY 12224

RE: S.3394-A / A.3226-A — The Ceasing Repeated and Extremely Egregious Predatory (CREEP) Behavior Act

Dear Governor Hochul:

The New York City Bar Association has reviewed S.3394-A / A.3226-A, the Ceasing Repeated and Extremely Egregious Predatory (CREEP) Behavior Act, through its relevant committees, which include members with expertise in criminal law and criminal court, family law and family court, civil rights, New York State Supreme Court practice and judicial administration, domestic violence, and children and the law.

We understand the impetus for this bill and the problem it seeks to address. The current legal framework may leave some stalking and harassment victims without adequate recourse, particularly given the reality that digital technologies have substantially expanded the tools available to stalkers—enabling low-cost, high-volume harassment across platforms in ways that existing statutes do not fully address. Moreover, 43 other states have enacted some form of civil anti-stalking remedy; and a civil mechanism could reduce pressure on victims to pursue criminal prosecution, which may carry unintended consequences including escalation, immigration risk, or community harm.

However, our review also surfaced substantial legal concerns—particularly around due process and consequences for minors and other vulnerable populations—that we believe require attention. We believe chapter amendments are needed if the bill is going to be signed into law to ensure that a law intended to prevent harassment does not, in turn, become a vehicle for harassment. While our letter does not provide specific language for chapter amendments, we explain our concerns below and respectfully offer recommendations for possible ways to address them. We would welcome the opportunity to work with your office to further develop such amendments.

I. PRIMARY CONCERN: DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS FOR RESPONDENTS

The most significant and broadly shared concern across our committees relates to the lack of procedural protections available to respondents under the bill. The bill’s enforcement mechanism—criminal contempt—means that violations carry criminal consequences; yet the underlying proceeding that gives rise to the order does not provide the procedural safeguards that ordinarily accompany proceedings with criminal implications. This asymmetry between the consequences of a final or temporary order and the process by which it is obtained was a central critique among our committees.

a. Absence of Appointed Counsel

Unlike Criminal Court and Family Court proceedings involving orders of protection, where respondents are routinely advised by assigned counsel familiar with the nature and consequences of such orders, the CREEP Act contains no provision for the appointment of counsel for indigent respondents. Unrepresented respondents appearing before Supreme Court civil parts would lack the guidance necessary to understand the legal ramifications of an anti-stalking order, including the criminal penalties for violation.

The absence of counsel raises significant concerns, including:

• Practical comprehension: Respondents may consent to orders—or fail to contest them effectively—without understanding that they are subjecting themselves to potential felony exposure for any subsequent violation. In Criminal and Family Court, judges advise respondents in open court of these consequences; there is no analogous mechanism in the civil Supreme Court context.
• Self-incrimination risk: An unrepresented respondent required to testify in an open civil proceeding may inadvertently make statements that could be used against them in a subsequent criminal prosecution arising from the same underlying conduct. This concern is particularly acute given that the bill does not restrict the use of civil testimony in related criminal proceedings.

We recommend that the bill provide a right to counsel at all material phases of the proceedings and include authority for the court to appoint counsel for indigent respondents.

b. Timing and Adequacy of Hearing on Temporary Orders

The bill permits courts to issue temporary anti-stalking orders ex parte, with a hearing to follow “as soon as practicable.” This lack of specificity with respect to timing raises substantial concerns that, in practice, temporary orders could remain in effect for extended periods—potentially months—before a respondent has any meaningful opportunity to be heard. Temporary orders of protection can have immediate and serious consequences, including restrictions on a respondent’s ability to access their home, workplace, or educational institution. The bill does not appear to provide a mechanism for an expedited hearing to challenge a temporary order, nor does it establish a time limit within which the hearing must occur.

In contrast, the existing frameworks in Criminal and Family Court provide more structured timelines and clearer procedural pathways for respondents to challenge ex parte relief. At a minimum, a defined outer limit on the duration of a temporary order absent a hearing and a mechanism for an expedited return date would better align the bill with baseline due process requirements. For example, the bill could be amended to require a hearing “as soon as practicable and in no event more than 14 days later absent consent of the respondent.”

c. Anonymous and Digital Service of Process

The bill permits applications against anonymous or pseudonymous respondents, including digital actors who have not been identified by name. While we recognize the sponsors’ intent to address technology-facilitated harassment by unknown perpetrators, the bill as drafted raises concerns about the adequacy of service on anonymous parties and the notice implications for any resulting order. In particular, it is unclear how a respondent who is not identifiable by name can meaningfully receive notice of an order against them, or how law enforcement would enforce such an order. This provision raises questions about the basic constitutional adequacy of notice that should be addressed.

d. Duration of Final Orders

The bill provides for a five-year final order of protection to be issued if the allegations in the petition are proven. By comparison, in Article 8 proceedings in Family Court, final orders of protection last up to two years and can last up to five years only with an additional showing of aggravating circumstances. The five-year provision is excessive, as it matches or exceeds the longest orders available under the current framework and would be obtained through a process with fewer procedural safeguards. The availability of such lengthy orders is particularly problematic given the extent to which these orders may restrict freedom of speech, freedom of movement, housing, and employment based on findings made under a low evidentiary standard. A five-year duration also significantly increases a person’s exposure to criminal punishment—and the collateral life consequences that may result—for engaging in conduct that would be lawful if not for the order.

e. Absence of a Minimum Age Requirement

The bill establishes no minimum age for respondents. We are troubled by the due process implications of anti-stalking orders—with their criminal enforcement mechanism—being entered against minors. We believe the bill’s procedural framework is not appropriate for juvenile respondents and would recommend that respondents must be over the age of 18, with allegations against people under 18 redirected to Family Court.

f. Respondents with Mental Illness or Cognitive Disabilities

Members also raised due process concerns specific to respondents with mental illness or cognitive disabilities. Such individuals may be at elevated risk both of becoming subject to these orders and of inadvertently violating them—particularly without access to counsel. Disparate patterns seen in criminal court and in civil commitment proceedings could be replicated under this bill.

II. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AND VULNERABLE POPULATIONS

Orders of protection under the bill can have significant potential downstream effects on respondents, particularly those from vulnerable populations. For example:

• Employment: A temporary order barring a respondent from their workplace could result in termination before any hearing establishes whether the order was warranted. The bill does not appear to address this scenario or provide any remedy for a respondent who suffers irreversible employment harm based on an ex parte order that is subsequently vacated.
• Community supervision: Individuals subject to probation or parole conditions may face carceral consequences if a temporary anti-stalking order conflicts with their supervision requirements. The intersection of this civil remedy with the conditions of community supervision does not appear to have been addressed.
• Immigration status: Respondents with insecure or undocumented immigration status face heightened risks in any civil proceeding, particularly one in which they are unrepresented. An unrepresented respondent might disclose information in open court that could have adverse immigration consequences, and the existence of an anti-stalking order or a related criminal contempt conviction could itself create immigration risks.

In addition, we are concerned about the risk of disparate application. Orders of protection have been observed to reflect the implicit biases of courts, and to fall disproportionately against parties who can be more easily “othered” in a given context.

The weakness of the procedural protections for respondents is particularly concerning given the severity of potential consequences of orders of protection combined with the risks posed by implicit biases.

III. FIRST AMENDMENT AND OVERBREADTH CONCERNS

Another concern is that the bill, as currently drafted, could be used to restrain constitutionally protected speech and expressive activity. The statutory definition of covered conduct, which includes harassment and courses of conduct that cause distress or fear, is sufficiently broad that it could encompass persistent political criticism, protest activity, or advocacy that falls within the First Amendment’s protection. Analogous civil harassment statutes in other states have been invoked in precisely this manner, including in documented attempts to use such orders to suppress critical online commentary and political speech.

The concern is not hypothetical. Where a busy trial court is presented with an ex parte application alleging distressing repeated contact—including, for example, persistent criticism of a public official online, or repeated attendance at political events—the absence of an explicit First Amendment carve-out could lead to issuance of a temporary order that restrains protected activity before any opportunity for adversarial testing. Even if such an order is ultimately vacated, the chilling effect during the period of its enforcement could be substantial.

Another potential consequence of the bill implicates religious liberty: a dispute between congregants or members of a religious community could result in a temporary order barring an individual from their place of worship, implicating Free Exercise concerns that the bill does not appear to address.        

IV. STRUCTURAL AND IMPLEMENTATION CONCERNS

Beyond the substantive legal concerns above, we note several structural issues that may affect the practical operation of the bill.

a. Supreme Court as the venue

The bill provides a route to obtaining a civil order of protection in New York State Supreme Court. However, Supreme Court justices sitting in civil parts are not generally experienced with orders of protection, including the practical issues that routinely arise—shared housing, workplace access, community supervision implications, and the dynamics of domestic and interpersonal conflict. In Criminal and Family Court, experienced practitioners and jurists regularly navigate these issues; in the civil Supreme Court context, neither the bench nor the bar may be well-positioned to identify and address them. The likely result is a process that would systematically advantage petitioners with private counsel—who can navigate an unfamiliar forum—over unrepresented respondents, compounding the inequality already created by the absence of assigned counsel. If the bill signed into law, it is important that the courts take steps to address this issue, such as the establishment of specific parts to adjudicate the proceedings that will result.[1]

b. Coordination with Law Enforcement and Prosecutors

When a Criminal or Family Court order of protection is violated, responding officers and prosecutors have institutional familiarity with the underlying case. In contrast, civil Supreme Court orders will typically lack this context, which could lead to arrests based on violation allegations without the benefit of prosecutorial screening—which, in turn, would increase arraignment volumes and potentially expose respondents to criminal proceedings that are subsequently dismissed—but not before significant harm has occurred.

c. Potential for Misuse

We are also concerned by the potential for the bill’s procedures to be used for purposes other than those intended. For example: a landlord seeking to use an anti-stalking order as a tool to remove a tenant without proceeding through the required eviction process; parties in neighborhood or condominium disputes using the bill’s expedited procedures as a pressure mechanism; and, as discussed above, use of the process to suppress online criticism or unwanted public commentary. The bill does not appear to include express provisions guarding against bad-faith or pretextual applications.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the concerns described above, we respectfully offer the following recommendations that we believe could help overcome some of the legal infirmities of the bill as currently drafted.

• Right to counsel: provide respondents with a right to counsel at all material phases of the proceeding and create authority for the court to appoint counsel for indigent respondents.
• Hearing timelines: require a hearing “as soon as practicable and in no event more than 14 days later absent consent of the respondent.”
• Minimum age: respondents must be over the age of 18, with allegations against people under 18 redirected to Family Court.
• Collateral consequences: explicitly require consideration of freedom of speech, adverse housing and employment consequences, and require orders to specifically recite those considerations. The bill should also be reviewed for its interaction with community supervision conditions, immigration proceedings, and mental health concerns and adjudications. Copies of all applications should be provided to the Attorney General’s office to monitor misuse.
• Anonymous respondents: require orders granting permission to serve by internet or against anonymous respondents to explicitly recite why service in that manner is expected to achieve actual notice.
• Order duration: replace 5-year limit with same durations as Family Court.

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The City Bar appreciates the opportunity to share our concerns and recommendations with respect to S.3394-A / A.3226-A. We hope these comments are useful. The City Bar is committed to constructive engagement and would welcome the opportunity to further discuss these issues as you analyze the bill.

Respectfully Submitted,

Matthew Diller, President
New York City Bar Association