Committee Reports

New York for All Act: City Bar Urges Passage of Immigration Protections

BILL INFORMATION

A.3506-B (AM Reyes)/ S.2235-B (Sen. Gounardes)- amending the criminal procedure law, the executive law, the general municipal law, the education law, the correction law and the public officers law, in relation to prohibiting and regulating the discovery and disclosure of immigration status; and to repeal certain provisions of the correction law relating thereto (NYS 2025-26)

OUTCOME

Adopted as part of the FY 2027 NYS Budget

REPORT

REPORT ON LEGISLATION BY THE RULE OF LAW TASK FORCE
AND THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW COMMITTEE

A.3506-B (M. of A. Reyes)
S.2235-B (Sen. Gounardes)

AN ACT to amend the criminal procedure law, the executive law, the general municipal law, the education law, the correction law and the public officers law, in relation to prohibiting and regulating the discovery and disclosure of immigration status; and to repeal certain provisions of the correction law relating thereto

New York for All Act

THIS BILL IS APPROVED

The New York City Bar Association (City Bar), through its Rule of Law Task Force and Immigration and Nationality Law Committee, writes to express its strong support for legislation in New York State to prevent abuses stemming from federal immigration enforcement. Three bills pending in the Legislature—the New York for All Act;[1] the Local Cops, Local Crimes Act;[2] and the Sensitive Locations Protection Act[3]—would provide vital protections. These proposals would prohibit civil immigration arrests in sensitive locations without judicial warrants and limit the use of state and local resources for federal immigration enforcement, in addition to other important provisions.

The City Bar believes the New York for All Act would provide the most comprehensive protections and urges its enactment. If it is not enacted, we urge the Legislature to enact the Local Cops, Local Crimes and Sensitive Locations Protection Acts.

The safety of New York’s communities and the constitutional rights of its people are under threat from the federal government’s draconian immigration enforcement policies.[4] These bills would invoke New York’s legal authority to prevent the state and its local governments from supporting or participating in federal immigration enforcement activities by ensuring that state and local officials do not provide access to property or supply information to federal immigration enforcement authorities unless required to do so by judicial order or federal law. While the bills deprive federal immigration officials of the support and cooperation of New York’s state and local government personnel and resources, they in no way obstruct the federal government from exercising its lawful enforcement of the immigration laws.

The New York for All Act represents the most comprehensive approach, encompassing the limitations on use of state resources in the Local Cops, Local Crimes Act and the warrant requirement for nonpublic government-controlled locations in Sensitive Locations Protection Act.[5] And it features farther-reaching protections that neither of the other two bills include. Accordingly, we urge the Legislature to prioritize passage of the New York for All Act. However, approval of the Local Cops, Local Crimes Act and the Sensitive Locations Protection Act, both of which Governor Hochul proposed,[6] would provide some essential protections.

This report begins by summarizing each bill’s provisions. It then discusses the importance of the protections the bills would provide and the state’s legal basis to enact these measures.

I. THREE BILLS TO PROTECT NEW YORKERS AGAINST IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ABUSES

A. New York for All Act (A.3506-B / S.2235-B)

The New York for All Act’s primary features include: (1) barring federal immigration agents from entering certain areas of property controlled by state and local governments, and (2) limiting the use of state resources for immigration enforcement, including the collection and sharing of information that could be relevant for immigration enforcement.

The Act mandates that state and local employees prohibit federal immigration agents from entering non-public areas of government-controlled property without a judicial warrant. These locations include buildings such as schools and the Department of Motor Vehicles.

The Act precludes state and local agencies and employees, law enforcement officers, and probation departments from using state agencies’ resources for federal immigration enforcement, including conducting investigations for immigration information, transferring individuals to ICE custody, and colluding with immigration authorities (with or without contracts). It prohibits state and local police and correctional departments from entering into any agreements with federal immigration authorities for the purpose of immigration enforcement.

State and local employees, including police, probation officers, and school employees, would be barred from independently collecting and investigating immigration information, such as immigration status and violations, and providing personally sensitive information (e.g., Social Security Number, date of birth, etc.) and information about release or court dates to federal authorities. Additionally, employees would be prohibited from entering immigration information into a public database, unless required by law or for a social benefit. Probation departments would not be allowed to communicate with immigration authorities about anyone who is or has been under department supervision. And schools and the State Education Department would be required to develop policies for managing student data, including for when they receive requests for such information from immigration authorities.

Under federal law, state and local governments are prohibited from restricting the communication of immigration information between state officials and federal immigration authorities.[7] In compliance with these laws, the New York for All Act permits state and local officials to communicate immigration information to ICE when required by law. However, such information would be limited by the prohibition against employees independently gathering immigration information during the course of their duties. In other words, the bill would effectively limit or prevent state and local officials from offering actionable immigration information to ICE authorities without explicitly restricting the communication of such information in violation of federal law.

The Act contains important provisions beyond those related to access to non-public state-controlled spaces and use of state resources. It prohibits state and local governmental personnel from using ICE agents as interpreters. It also ensures that individuals in law enforcement custody are informed of their rights before being interviewed by immigrations agents, and inmates must receive notice when immigration authorities are given access to facilities for interviews. As another guardrail, the bill establishes an annual, public record listing the number of times immigration authorities sought help from state employees, while also requiring that all communications between immigration authorities and state employees be recorded.

Finally, the attorney general would be empowered to solicit and receive complaints from the public about improper uses of resources by state or local entities for immigration enforcement and other violations of this bill’s provisions. The bill directs the attorney general to investigate all such complaints to determine whether a violation of state law occurred, and if so, bring civil actions for declaratory and equitable relief against the responsible parties.

B. Local Cops, Local Crimes Act (Program Bill #18)

The Local Cops, Local Crimes Act would limit the use of government resources for immigration enforcement. It would ban state and local participation in agreements pursuant to Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. There are different “models” of these agreements, which involve ICE deputizing local law enforcement officers[8] and allowing them to execute certain federal immigration enforcement undertakings, including investigating, identifying, and detaining individuals solely based on civil immigration violations. There are fourteen active “287(g) agreements” in New York State.[9] This Act would end these agreements, prohibiting state and local law enforcement from formally acting with or under the authority of the federal government for immigration enforcement. It would dismantle any such agreements and ban any future agreements with ICE through July 1, 2029.

C. Sensitive Locations Protection Act (Program Bill #19)

The Sensitive Locations Protection Act regulates access to government-controlled or owned locations by federal immigration authorities. There are three pertinent provisions of the bill. First, government-controlled sensitive locations must refuse entry to civil immigration enforcement agents in any non-public area, unless the agent presents a valid warrant from a federal court. A sensitive location is defined as a school, institution of higher education, child care facility, health care facility, house of worship, or housing accommodation.

Second, privately-owned sensitive locations are permitted, but not required, to adopt policies blocking immigration enforcement from non-public areas. However, those policies also cannot override a valid judicial warrant. If a privately owned sensitive location denies access to immigration enforcement agents lacking a valid warrant, New York state law will not hold the owner liable for doing so.

Third, if any of the above prohibitions are violated, the state attorney general, an affected individual, or the owner or operator of the sensitive location can sue in the New York Supreme Court for equitable or declaratory relief. This remedy does not purport to hold federal officers accountable. Rather, it would apply to state employees who fail to follow the Act’s provisions. Because the remedy does not apply to federal officials, it can coexist with federal law and would likely survive challenges under the Supremacy Clause.

II. LIMITING USE OF STATE AND LOCAL RESOURCES FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PROTECTS COMMUNITIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

The New York for All Act and the Local Cops, Local Crimes Act both limit use of state and local resources for federal immigration enforcement. While the Local Cops, Local Crimes Act’s ban on 287(g) agreements is a strong, positive step, it alone is not sufficient. Through informal collaboration, local and state law enforcement actors could continue to assist in federal enforcement investigations.[10] The New York for All Act provides critical protections against such informal collaborations, creating a stronger check on federal access to state and local resources.

Limiting participation in federal immigration enforcement will allow state and local governments to effectively serve all members of their communities and prevent the use of state personnel and resources for improper and unconstitutional purposes.

Collaboration between local law enforcement and federal immigration agencies can have disastrous consequences for individuals and communities. Blurring the lines between state and local officials, on the one hand, and federal immigration enforcement, on the other, makes local law enforcement appear as an extension of the federal government. In such situations, people in vulnerable communities are deterred from seeking vital local services, including reporting crimes, out of fear that they will be reported to immigration authorities.[11] This reality is supported by empirical data. A 2013 study revealed that half of immigrants and more than two-thirds of undocumented individuals were less likely to report crimes out of fear that officers would interrogate them about their immigration status.[12] In one tragic case, a child died when his parents delayed seeking medical treatment because they feared hospital workers might report them to federal agents.[13] Another study found that, on average, 35.5 fewer crimes are committed per 10,000 in counties with sanctuary policies, including lower rates of violent and property crime.[14] Such studies corroborate the experience of local law enforcement. A former Suffolk County police commissioner explained, “We solve crimes based on people coming to us … If people think they’re going to get deported every time they speak to a police officer, it’s not helpful.”[15] The New York for All Act and Local Cops, Local Crime Act, therefore, preserve conditions required for safer and more effective policing.

State and local agencies’ assistance or participation in immigration enforcement also creates greater risks of involvement in constitutional violations. A 287(g) agreement in Nassau County grants police officers “the authority to stop, question, and arrest any resident they believe is in the United States illegally.”[16] This arrangement and others like it provide more opportunity for local police to racially profile individuals under the guise of federal immigration enforcement authority.[17] Notably, the version of 287(g) agreement that Nassau entered—the “Task Force Model”—was reinstated by the federal government in the past year, after it was previously abandoned for over a decade following multiple instances of civil rights violations.[18]

The possibility of racial profiling is heightened by the Supreme Court’s recent emergency order in Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, granting a stay of a lower court ruling that barred immigration agents from relying on certain factors in deciding to stop individuals. Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurrence, stated that “apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion; under this Court’s case law regarding immigration stops, however, it can be a ‘relevant factor’ when considered along with other salient factors.”[19] This statement suggests a gaping hole that would allow for constitutional violations, especially of the Fourth Amendment. Allowing ethnicity to be a factor in enforcement stops threatens to place minorities, both those who are citizens and undocumented, in a constant state of fear of being targeted based upon the way they look and speak.[20]

New York has a critical interest in avoiding support for or participation in federal immigration enforcement activities because such involvement would contribute to an unfolding legal and humanitarian crisis suffered by ICE detainees and their families. Undocumented immigrants are not the only people facing harm. People who are in the country legally and even U.S. citizens are among those who have been captured in the dragnet. Nearly 75 percent of the roughly 68,000 people held in ICE custody as of December 2025 had no criminal convictions.[21] From detention centers in Batavia, New York, to 26 Federal Plaza in Manhattan, detainees have reported inhumane living conditions, severe lack of medical treatment, and officers beating detainees or placing them in solitary confinement for durations that meet New York State’s definition of torture.[22] In 2025, 32 people died in ICE custody across the country, making it the agency’s deadliest year in more than two decades.[23] Moreover, the government is attempting to deny detainees bond hearings, forcing them to languish indefinitely under conditions that are far closer to maximum security prisons than civil detention centers.[24] New York should have no role in this dangerous, arbitrary, and lawless system of immigration enforcement.

Finally, immigration enforcement imposes financial costs on already strained local governments. The New York City Council found in 2014 that honoring federal immigration detainer requests cost the city government at least $17 million per year,[25] and the city ultimately settled a lawsuit stemming from the practice for nearly $100 million.[26] New York City has since prohibited honoring most such requests.[27] Other studies show that requiring local law enforcement to grant these detainers costs tens of millions of dollars annually in several states, detracting local resources from vital public safety programs.[28]

The provisions of the New York for All Act and Local Cops, Local Crimes Act that limit collaboration with immigration enforcement are on firm legal footing. States may decide whether to use local and state-controlled public resources to aid federal immigration enforcement. This authority is protected by the Tenth Amendment, which limits the federal government to expressly enumerated powers and safeguards state sovereignty in regulating local affairs, including public safety.[29] Courts have held that New York State and local law enforcement are prohibited from carrying out immigration enforcement actions absent formal authorization under 287(g) agreements.[30] Such agreements are, by definition, voluntary and preserve the state’s discretion in deciding whether to participate in federal immigration enforcement. While the federal government has the power to enforce immigration policy, states retain the power to abstain from their implementation and enforce non-participation by denying state resources to federal authorities.

Prohibitions on localities’ immigration-related policies, including the adoption of 287(g) agreements, are within the state’s authority to regulate local governments. Under the New York Constitution, the existence and powers of local governments are derived from the state,[31] and powers granted by the Legislature can be “repealed, diminished, impaired or suspended” through enactment of a state law.[32] The state has previously exercised this power to regulate intergovernmental agreements involving localities.[33] Additionally, the Court of Appeals has recognized that local policies that conflict with state law are invalid.[34] In People v. De Jesus, the court observed that “since the fount of the police power is the sovereign State, such power can be exercised by a local government unit only when and to the degree it has been delegated such lawmaking authority.”[35] Local collaboration with federal immigration enforcement in the face of state law barring it is impermissible.

III. PROTECTING SENSITIVE LOCATIONS FROM UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEARCHES

The New York for All Act and the Sensitive Locations Protection Act would ban immigration agents from entering nonpublic areas of government-controlled properties without judicial warrants.[36] The Sensitive Locations Protection Act would also give private owners of sensitive locations the discretion to extend protection to their buildings as well.

Protecting sensitive locations helps maintain trust between immigrant communities and public institutions. Shielding schools and childcare facilities specifically ensures that children are not deterred from attending school and that families are not torn apart during school drop-off or pickup. Community members deserve to feel safe in their schools, hospitals, and places of worship, without fear of being separated from their families and deported.

Sensitive locations have received reasonable sanctuary from civil immigration officers since the Clinton Administration, and they deserve a continuation of those strict protections. In 2011, the Obama Administration broadened the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) sensitive spaces policy, prohibiting a greater range of officer actions and expanding the types of locations covered by the policy.[37] In 2021, the Biden Administration made the most significant expansion of the federal sensitive spaces policy, further expanding the definition of locations encapsulated by this policy.[38] In 2025, the Trump Administration fully rescinded this policy and, in its place, issued a new policy that allows for more discretion of ICE officers in deciding where they can enforce ICE policies.[39] This new policy does not afford individuals and families the same sense of peace and security to feel safe in their communities, and leaves it up to the states to enact their own policies to fill in the gaps left by the new DHS policy.

New York’s authority to implement a judicial warrant requirement is backed by substantive and procedural law. In regard to state-controlled property, the Tenth Amendment reserves to states all powers not delegated to the federal government. Congress has never passed legislation explicitly authorizing federal agents to enter nonpublic areas of state buildings without judicial warrants, so there is no conflicting federal law to override this statute and power remains within state sovereign authority to regulate.

Additionally, the proposals do not run afoul of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine, which prevents states from enacting a law that “regulates the United States directly or discriminates against the federal government…”[40] Limiting access to nonpublic areas of state properties does neither. The bills would treat federal agents no differently from members of the public who are generally not permitted in private areas of government buildings. This is not a regulation of the federal agents’ ability to conduct their lawful functions. Rather, the state would be declining to grant them special access.

Restrictions on uses of state-controlled property for immigration enforcement are already in effect in New York, and they have survived judicial scrutiny. Former Governor Andrew Cuomo issued an executive order prohibiting “civil arrests by federal immigration authorities” without a judicial warrant inside state facilities.[41] The District Court for the Northern District in November 2025 upheld the validity of the order, stating, “Settled federalism principles and the Tenth Amendment generally empower the States to control the use of their own facilities.”[42]

The Sensitive Locations Protection Act’s requirement of judicial warrants to enter homes is merely a reassertion of applicable law. It is a necessary response to the Department of Homeland Security’s incorrect claim that immigration agents only need administrative warrants to enter private homes.[43] Administrative warrants, which are often based on outdated information and can lead to collateral arrests,[44] are issued by executive branch officials instead of judges.[45] The absence of judicial approval violates the Fourth Amendment.[46] In Payton v. New York, the U.S. Supreme Court held that police cannot enter a home to make an arrest without a judicial warrant.[47] This decision did not depend on whether the arrest was civil or criminal, and it made no exception for immigration enforcement. The Court’s rulings in Coolidge v. New Hampshire[48] and Shadwick v. City of Tampa[49] also emphasize the fundamental role of warrants in providing a judicial check on the executive based on the Fourth Amendment. These cases establish that requiring immigration agents to present a judicial warrant to enter private residences is a requirement of the Constitution, regardless of any law a state might enact.

IV. THE BILLS ARE A VALID EXERCISE OF NEW YORK’S POLICE POWERS AND ARE NOT PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW

A. Police Power

The core constitutional principle of federalism recognizes that state and federal governments have “elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.”[50] Federalism embodies the founders’ belief that smaller governments “closer to the governed” serve as better stewards of citizens’ daily lives than a “distant federal bureaucracy.”[51] Under the Tenth Amendment, the Constitution reserves powers not delegated to the United States to the States and the People. The Supreme Court has also reiterated this unequivocally, stating, “The Constitution withholds from Congress a plenary power.”[52]

Fundamentally, this means that states retain their own “police power,” which is the power to regulate day-to-day public safety and the well-being of their own localities. Upholding this responsibility, in turn, necessitates that states control their own officers and resources as they deem fit. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from appropriating state and local officers to assist with federal policies, including civil immigration enforcement.[53] Therefore, a “quintessential police power” retained by state and local governments is the “ability to regulate internal law enforcement activities,” including those relating to immigration matters.[54]

The three bills are valid exercises of New York’s police power. They only regulate the use of state and local resources in protecting public safety and community welfare, and make no attempt to discriminate against, regulate, or direct federal immigration enforcement. Moreover, the prohibitions against 287(g) agreements in both the New York for All Act and the Local Cops, Local Crimes Act are valid. Participation in federal immigration enforcement activities through 287(g) agreements is voluntary, and because states are free to dictate how local and state public resources are used, they can prohibit state entities and officials from being deputized under such agreements.

B. Preemption

Although the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution allows Congress to pass laws that preempt state and local bills, courts have maintained a strong presumption against preemption.[55] The presumption is strengthened if the preemption challenge relates directly to powers traditionally reserved under the State’s police power. Thus far, the U.S. Department of Justice has frequently invoked 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644 (which are nearly identical) in its challenges against sanctuary policies like these three bills, arguing that such laws obstruct federal immigration policy and restrict the communication of immigration information between state or local governments and federal immigration authorities.

But these statutes fail to preempt any of the three bills. First, the bills are not expressly preempted. Express preemption requires that a “federal statute expressly directs that state law be ousted” and while both federal statutes contain preemptive clauses, none of the three bills prohibit the sharing of immigration information between government entities and federal immigration authorities.[56] The New York for All Act only goes so far as to prohibit state and local entities from either independently collecting immigration information during the course of their duties or disclosing personally sensitive information (e.g., court release dates, date of birth, Social Security Number, etc.) to ICE agents, neither of which restrict or prohibit the sharing of immigration information per se with federal authorities. In fact, the bill expressly allows all state and local entities to share such information with ICE as required by law. Additionally, since the federal sensitive spaces policy is not binding law, it cannot preempt states passing their own sensitive spaces policies.

Second, the laws are not “impliedly preempted,” even if they create circumstances that would make it more challenging for federal officials to enforce immigration laws than if they had the cooperation of state and local government. The Supreme Court has held that the “possibility that federal enforcement priorities might be upset” is insufficient to provide grounds for implied preemption.[57]

Third, field preemption does not apply here because as mentioned, the three bills make no attempt to directly regulate immigration policy or federal agents; they only direct state and local public resources which are well within the purview of New York’s police power.

V. CONCLUSION

By abusing its enforcement powers and creating a reign of terror in our nation, the federal government has forfeited any claim to assistance by the State of New York in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. The federal government must drastically reform its policies to regain the trust that it has lost. In the meantime, the protections offered by these three bills are vitally necessary to the safety and security of New Yorkers.

The New York City Bar Association supports all three bills, but believes the Legislature and Governor should prioritize enactment of the New York for All Act because it offers the most comprehensive protections. If it does not pass, we urge the enactment of the Local Cops, Local Crimes, and Sensitive Locations Protection Acts.

 

Rule of Law Task Force
Susan J. Kohlmann, Chair

Immigration & Nationality Law Committee
Dorian E. Rojas, Co-Chair
Ludivine Van Der Heyden, Co-Chair

 

March 2026

Footnotes

[1] S. 2235-B / A. 3506-B, 2025-2026 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2026), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S2235/amendment/B. (All websites last accessed March 27, 2026)

[2] Governor’s Program Bill No. 18 (N.Y. 2026), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/gpb_18-local_cops_local_crimes_act-bill.pdf.

[3] Governor’s Program Bill No. 19 (N.Y. 2026), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/default/files/2026-01/gpb_19-sensitive_location_projection_act-bill.pdf.

[4] See generally Report on the Trump Administration’s 2025-2026 Changes to Immigration Law, N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n (Jan. 26, 2026), https://www.nycbar.org/reports/the-trump-administrations-early-2025-changes-to-immigration-law/.  

[5] See The New York for All Act vs. Gov. Hochul’s 287(g) Proposal, NYCLU, https://www.nyclu.org/uploads/2026/02/2026-OnePager-NY4AvsHochul-v2-1.pdf.

[6] Keeping New Yorkers Safe: Governor Hochul Introduces the Local Cops, Local Crimes Act to Stop ICE from Co-Opting Local Law Enforcement, N.Y. State (Jan. 30, 2026), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/keeping-new-yorkers-safe-governor-hochul-introduces-local-cops-local-crimes-act-stop-ice-co.

[7] See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (prohibiting any state or local government entity or official from restricting the sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service “information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual”); 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (banning prohibitions or restrictions on any state or local government entity or official “sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States”).

[8] See Simon McCormack & Ify Chikezie, What are 287(g) Agreements and How Do They Fuel Trump’s Mass Deportations?, NYCLU (Feb. 4, 2026), https://www.nyclu.org/commentary/what-are-287g-agreements-and-how-do-they-fuel-trumps-mass-deportations.

[9] Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, https://www.ice.gov/identify-and-arrest/287g; see also Make the Road New York Welcomes Ban of 287(g) Agreements in New York State; Pledges to Keep Working as Momentum Builds Towards New York for All, Make the Road N.Y. (Jan. 30, 2026), https://maketheroadny.org/287gban/.

[10] Liv Veazey, Hochul Proposed Banning ICE Collaboration Contracts. Here’s What You Need to Know., Next N.Y. (Jan. 31, 2026), https://nysfocus.com/2026/01/31/hochul-sanctuary-ice-immigration-287g-jail-bill.

[11] See, e.g., Omar Martinez et al., Evaluating the Impact of Immigration Policies on Health Status Among Undocumented Immigrants: A Systematic Review, 17 J. Immigr. Minor. Health 947, 964 (2015); Scott D. Rhodes et al., The Impact of Local Immigration Enforcement Policies on the Health of Immigrant Hispanics/Latinos in the United States, 105 Am. J. Pub. Health 329, 332 (2015); see Tom K. Wong et al., How Interior Immigration Enforcement Affects Trust in Law Enforcement, U.S. Immigration Pol. Ctr., U.C. San Diego (Apr. 3, 2019), https://usipc.ucsd.edu/publications/usipc-working-paper-2.pdf.

[12] Nik Theodore, Insecure Communities: Latino Perceptions of Police Involvement in Immigration Enforcement, Dep’t of Urb. Plan. and Pol’y, Univ. of Ill. at Chi., at 5-6 (May 2013), https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/INSECURE_COMMUNITIES_REPORT_FINAL.PDF.

[13] Elizabeth M. McCormick, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law: A Failed Approach to Immigration Enforcement and a Poor Substitute for Real Reform, 20 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 165, 199 (2016).

[14] Tom K. Wong, The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy, Ctr. for American Progress (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-effects-of-sanctuary-policies-on-crime-and-the-economy/.

[15] Pamela Constable, For Immigrant Women, Domestic Violence Creates a Double Shadow, Wash. Post (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/for-immigrant-women-domestic-violence-creates-a-double-shadow/2013/12/02/5626b85e-55e6-11e3-8304-caf30787c0a9_story.html; see also Off. of N.Y. State Att’y Gen. et al., Setting the Record Straight, at 14-17 (May 2017), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/setting_the_record_straight.pdf (collecting similar commentary from additional law enforcement leaders).

[16]  N.Y. Orgs File First Suit in New York Over Unlawful Deputization of Local Officers As ICE Agents in Nassau County, NYCLU (June 24, 2025), https://www.nyclu.org/press-release/lawsuit-ny-orgs-file-first-suit-in-new-york-over-unlawful-deputization-of-local-officers-as-ice-agents-in-nassau-county.

[17] See McCormack & Chikezie, supra note 8.

[18] See id.

[19] Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, 606 U.S. ___ (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

[20] See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Justice Brett Kavanaugh and Racial Proxies, SCOTUSblog (Sept. 23, 2025), https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/09/justice-brett-kavanaugh-and-racial-proxies/.

[21] Will Craft, Worst of the Worst? Most U.S. Immigrants Targeted for Deportation in 2025 Had No Criminal Charges, Documents Reveal, Guardian (Feb. 22, 2026), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/feb/22/us-immigration-trump-administration.

[22] Dale Shoemaker, ICE Abuse of Detainees in Batavia Facility, Investigative Post (Feb. 20, 2025), https://www.investigativepost.org/2025/02/20/521935/.

[23] Maanvi Singh et al., 2025 Was ICE’s Deadliest Year in Two Decades. Here are the 32 People Who Died in Custody, Guardian (Jan. 4, 2026), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2026/jan/04/ice-2025-deaths-timeline.

[24] Erica Bryant, ICE Is Denying People Bond to Keep Them Locked Up, Vera (Aug. 8 2025), https://www.vera.org/news/ice-is-denying-people-bond-to-keep-them-locked-up; see also Shoemaker, supra note 22.

[25] Committee Report of the Governmental Affairs Division, N.Y.C. Council (Oct. 15, 2014), https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/View.ashx?M=F&ID=3289150&GUID=CE322702-E977-44A1-920A-9230DEE6B33E.

[26] Luis Ferré- Sadurní, New York City to Pay $92.5 Million to Improperly Detained Immigrants, N.Y. Times (Dec. 18, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/18/nyregion/migrants-detention-settlement-deportation.html

[27] Id.

[28] See Alexandra Sirota & Lissette Guerrero, Local Communities Face High Costs of Federal Immigration Enforcement, Budget & Tax Ctr., N.C. Just. Ctr., at 4-5 (Apr. 2019), https://www.ncjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/BTC-REPORT_Cost-of-Immigration-Enforcement.pdf.

[29] Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).

[30] People ex rel. Wells v. DeMarco, 168 A.D.3d 31 (2018); see also People ex rel. Welikson v. Cronin, 202 A.D.3d 1437 (2022) (holding that it is unlawful for New York law enforcement to detain individuals solely to facilitate their transfer to federal immigration officials).

[31] N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(a).

[32] Id. at § 2(b)(1).

[33] N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 199-O.

[34] See, e.g., Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 71 N.Y.2d 91, 96-97 (1987) (“A local law may be ruled invalid as inconsistent with State law not only where an express conflict exists between the State and local laws, but also where the State has clearly evinced a desire to preempt an entire field thereby precluding any further local regulation.”).

[35] 54 N.Y.2d 465, 468 (1981).

[36] The City Bar has previously and continues to support the position that ICE must produce a valid judicial warrant before making arrests. Immigration & Nationality Law Commission, New York City Bar Association, Testimony Before the City Council on New York City’s Detainer Laws (Feb. 15, 2023), https://www.nycbar.org/reports/testimony-before-the-city-council-on-new-york-citys-detainer-laws.

[37] Elizabeth Jacobs, History of the ‘Sensitive Areas’ Policies and What Is in Place Now, Ctr. for Immigr. Stud. (Mar. 7, 2025), https://cis.org/Jacobs/History-Sensitive-Areas-Policies-and-What-Place-Now.

[38] Id.

[39] Id.

[40] North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 435 (1990); see also Sam Feineh, “ICE-Free Zones” Explained: How Cities and Counties are Working Together to Resist ICE, Vera (Mar. 9, 2026), https://www.vera.org/news-spotlights/ice-free-zones-explained.

[41] Exec. Order No. 170, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 8.170.

[42] United States v. N.Y., No. 25-cv-744, 2025 WL 3205011, *13 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2025) (citing Adderley v. Fla., 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (“The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated”)).

[43] Laura Strickler & Phil Helsel, ICE Policy Allows Officers to Enter Homes for Immigration Enforcement Without Judicial Warrant, NBC News (Jan. 21, 2026), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ice-policy-officers-enter-homes-immigration-without-judicial-warrant-rcna255305.

[44] Safeguarding the Integrity of Our Courts: The Impact of ICE Courthouse Operations in New York State, Immigrant Def. Project, https://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/Safeguarding-the-Integrity-of-Our-Courts-Final-Report.pdf.

[45] Brent Skorup, Administrative Warrants, Immigration Arrests, and the Fourth Amendment, Cato Inst. (Feb. 17, 2026), https://www.cato.org/blog/administrative-warrants-immigration-arrests-fourth-amendment.

[46] Hannah James, DHS Warrantless Home Entry Memo’s Fourth Amendment Problem, Just Sec. (Feb. 3, 2026), https://www.justsecurity.org/130497/dhs-warrantless-home-entry-fourth-amendment/; Orin Kerr, Can ICE Enter a Home to Make an Arrest With Only an Administrative Warrant?, Lawfare (Jan. 22, 2026), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/can-ice-enter-a-home-to-make-an-arrest-with-only-an-administrative-warrant.

[47] See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).

[48] See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).

[49] See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).

[50] Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012).

[51] The Federalist No. 45 (James Madison).

[52] United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).

[53] Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).

[54] United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 887 n.11 (9th Cir. 2019).

[55] See, e.g., New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995).

[56] Island Park, LLC v. CSX Transp., 559 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 2009).

[57] Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. 191, 212 (2020).