Committee Reports

Statement Regarding the Elimination of Independent Agencies in Mexico

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SUMMARY

The Vance Center and Inter-American Affairs Committee issued a statement on behalf of the City Bar expressing serious concern over eliminating autonomous agencies in Mexico and consolidating the functions of these independent agencies in the Executive Branch. The creation of autonomous agencies in Mexico was closely tied to the country’s transition to democracy. “These agencies serve as checks on executive power, promoting the separation of powers and strengthening democratic governance. Their independence allowed for the implementation of key reforms in areas such as human rights, transparency and economic development—essential elements in Mexico’s democratization process and the development of a modern rule-of-law state. Eliminating these autonomous agencies and transferring their powers to the Executive Branch undermines regulatory technical expertise by returning it to the political sphere, subjecting important public decisions that impact the country’s development to political fluctuations, and potentially impacting the country’s development.” 

REPORT

STATEMENT REGARDING THE ELIMINATION OF INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN MEXICO

The New York City Bar Association (City Bar) expresses serious concern over eliminating autonomous agencies in Mexico and consolidating the functions of these independent agencies in the Executive Branch, a measure approved by the Mexican Congress last week.[1] This reform, initially proposed by former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador and supported by current President Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo,[2] represents a significant threat to institutional independence and democratic principles that guarantee transparency, accountability, and protection of fundamental rights in Mexico.

The creation of autonomous agencies in Mexico was closely tied to the country’s transition to democracy, in response to the need for trustworthy and transparent institutions in the context of growing public demand for greater participation and accountability. These agencies serve as checks on executive power, promoting the separation of powers and strengthening democratic governance. Their independence allowed for the implementation of key reforms in areas such as human rights, transparency, and economic development—essential elements in Mexico’s democratization process and the development of a modern rule-of-law state.

Eliminating these autonomous agencies and transferring their powers to the Executive Branch undermines regulatory technical expertise by returning it to the political sphere, subjecting important public decisions that impact the country’s development to political fluctuations, and potentially impacting the country’s development. It also raises concerns over whether the move would breach the U.S. Mexico Canada Agreement (“USMCA”) further harming Mexico’s development, particularly in areas critical to transparency, anti-corruption, and economic competitiveness, as the USMCA mandates the existence of an antitrust authority to ensure fair treatment for member countries (Chapter 21) and promote transparency and anti-corruption measures in public functions (Chapter 27).

II. BACKGROUND

Since the 1990s, Mexico has established constitutionally autonomous bodies to protect key areas of public life. Independent agencies were set up with operational and budgetary autonomy, focusing on technical tasks that kept them separate from traditional politics. This autonomy allows these agencies to hold private or state actors accountable for violating constitutional regulations without fear of political backlash. Additionally, their focus on specific areas, such as economic development, competition, and telecommunications, enables experts in each field to make informed decisions based on specialized technical knowledge. These transformations were part of Mexico’s transition from a single-party system to a democratic regime open to pluralism, designed to diversify certain executive functions through autonomous bodies and ensure real independence.[3]

The independence of these bodies enables them to counter political influence and support open, accountable government. However, the current reform seeks to dissolve these agencies and transfer their functions to the Executive Branch, claiming it will allow a “more rational use of resources” to fund other government programs. This proposal has advanced despite both national and international criticism, including warnings that such a move could be a setback for democracy.[4]

Of course, these agencies were never intended to be exempt from accountability; in regular public life, their decisions and rulings can be monitored through parliamentary oversight, budgetary reviews, and even judicial review, as has happened in Mexico through challenges brought before the Supreme Court.

On February 5, 2024, former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador sent a package of more than 20 reforms, including the elimination of seven autonomous agencies.[5] Last week, Congress discussed and approved the proposal.

The following agencies have been eliminated:

  1. The National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information, and Protection of Personal Data (INAI is its acronym in Spanish) is responsible for guaranteeing access to public information and for protecting personal data held by public entities and private companies in Mexico. Its role is key for transparency, accountability, and privacy protection in the country.[6]
  2. The National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL is its acronym in Spanish) focuses on measuring poverty and assessing social development policies in Mexico. Its goal is to provide reliable and useful information about poverty levels and the policies aimed at reducing it, helping to make informed decisions in social policy.[7]
  3. The Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT is its acronym in Spanish) regulates and oversees the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors in Mexico. It promotes competition, protects users’ rights, and ensures wide access to communication technologies for everyone. Its role is essential for creating a competitive environment and improving service quality.[8]
  4. The Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE is its acronym in Spanish) works to promote and ensure fair competition in Mexico, aiming to prevent monopolies and create an efficient market that benefits consumers. Its responsibilities include investigating and penalizing anti-competitive practices, as well as reviewing mergers and acquisitions.[9]
  5. The National Commission for the Continuous Improvement of Education (Mejoredu is its acronym in Spanish) is responsible for creating and promoting policies for ongoing improvements in education. It sets guidelines and evaluates educational institutions in Mexico, aiming to raise education quality and ensure it is inclusive, equitable and effective.[10]
  6. The National Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH is its acronym in Spanish) oversees the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons in Mexico, promoting the efficient, safe and sustainable development of oil resources. It monitors exploration and production activities to ensure they follow legal and environmental standards.
  7. The Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE is its acronym in Spanish) regulates and supervises the energy sector in Mexico, including electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization, as well as the supply of natural gas and petroleum products. Its role is to ensure a safe, reliable, and competitive energy market.[11]

The reform proposes that these agencies be absorbed into areas of the federal public administration, arguing that there’s duplication of functions. Former President López Obrador claimed eliminating these agencies could save up to 100 billion pesos a year and has described some, like INAI, as “mere cover-ups”. He also argued that this institution has not been effective in exposing corruption in the country and that its commissioners have selectively withheld files.[12]

Although saving public funds is a potentially relevant argument in favor of the reform, the proposal has to be analyzed in the context of the work of these agencies, work that former President Lopez Obrador and the MORENA party appeared to regard as an afront to their agenda. This constitutional reform is the last piece of former President López Obrador’s systematic attacks on autonomous bodies, particularly INAI. Here are some examples:

  1. In former President López Obrador’s first year in office, citizen complaints about transparency jumped by 671% compared to former President Enrique Peña Nieto’s last year, especially targeting the Office of the Presidency, which frequently responded that it did not have the requested documentation. Although classified information decreased, nearly half of the complaints were due to lack of access to public information, with INAI ruling in several cases that this right had been violated. Complaints also increased against agencies like the National Lottery, the Treasury, and the Interior Ministry. [13] INAI reported nearly three times as many “non-existence of information” cases in López Obrador’s first year, totaling 14,801 compared to 3,850 under former President Felipe de Jesús Calderón Hinojosa and 5,659 under Peña Nieto. Compliance with information access also fell from 99.3% in 2017 to 97.2% in 2019. [14]
  2. In April 2021, former President López Obrador criticized INAI for filing an action of unconstitutionality against the National Registry of Mobile Telephone Users (PANAUT) in the Supreme Court, arguing that INAI and other autonomous agencies were created to protect big businesses and minority interests. López Obrador defended PANAUT as a way to protect people from crimes like extortion and kidnapping, emphasizing citizen security over business interests. He also accused phone companies of hypocrisy for demanding users’ personal data while opposing the registry. INAI, however, argued that the registry violates human rights, including data protection and access to information, by requiring biometric data.[15]
  3. In May 2021, INAI launched preliminary investigation INAI.3S.08.01-059/2021 against the Office of the Presidency for allegedly disclosing personal data of the organization Mexicans Against Corruption and Impunity during the May 7 morning conference. This case sparked criticism from experts who argued that requiring journalists to reveal their sources violates freedom of expression and could be seen as an act of intimidation.[16]
  4. On February 16, 2022, INAI responded to President López Obrador’s request to investigate the income of journalist Carlos Loret de Mola and to disclose any information received from citizens about him. INAI clarified that it does not have the authority to investigate individuals’ assets or request information from the Tax Administration Service (SAT) or the Financial Intelligence Unit for this purpose. It also reminded that, under the Constitution, personal and private information is protected and requires the individual’s consent for disclosure, especially when it involves financial data.[17]
  5. On August 17, 2022, INAI decided to sanction President López Obrador for revealing confidential tax information about journalist Carlos Loret de Mola, including personal and financial details, during an April 2022 conference. INAI stated that disclosing such information without legal authorization violates privacy and left it to the Presidency’s Internal Control Office to determine the specific punishment. This move was seen as retaliation against Loret de Mola, who had reported on potential conflicts of interest involving the President’s family, including the “Casa Gris” in Houston.[18]
  6. On November 30, 2023, López Obrador again criticized the National Institute of Transparency, Access to Information, and Protection of Personal Data (INAI), calling it a “mess” and suggesting that its officials do not efficiently fulfill their roles. During his conference, he asked the Ministry of the Interior to investigate INAI’s resource management and displayed an organizational chart, mocking its complex structure. López Obrador also accused INAI of being a costly body aligned with conservative interests since its creation during Vicente Fox’s administration.[19]
  7. Finally, in February 2024, the former president presented reforms to eliminate the agencies “with duplicity” of functions.[20]

Regarding the elimination of COFECE, between 2019 and 2024, former President López Obrador consistently criticized this agency, arguing that it obstructed his energy and economic policies. He claimed that COFECE, created during previous administrations, protected private interests and limited the State’s ability to intervene in strategic sectors like energy. One of his main criticisms was focused on its opposition to strengthening the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) as the country’s main energy producer. He accused COFECE of favoring private and foreign companies over state-owned ones, which he argued undermined Mexico’s energy sovereignty.

Attacks on the agency include:

  1. On June 22, 2020, the COFECE filed a constitutional challenge against the Ministry of Energy’s new electricity policy, arguing it harmed competition by favoring certain participants and creating barriers for new energy producers. That same day, López Obrador criticized the agency, calling them ineffective and bureaucratic.[21]
  2. On February 2022, López Obrador reaffirmed his position in favor of eliminating the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT) and COFECE, arguing that they were created to promote privatization and protect private interests. He acknowledged that he likely would not have time to implement these reforms due to a lack of support from the opposition and the need for constitutional changes. López Obrador proposed returning these agencies’ functions to government ministries to save resources. He also criticized their autonomy, claiming they act as parallel governments without democratic legitimacy, and highlighted incidents like COFECE’s approval of transferring a lithium mine to a Chinese company without informing the Executive branch.[22]
  3. In April 2023, the Mexican government agreed to acquire 13 power generation plants from Iberdrola for approximately $6 billion, aiming to strengthen state participation in the energy sector. The COFECE reviewed the transaction and, in February 2024, authorized it with conditions to ensure market competition, such as independent operation of the plants and the prevention of sensitive information exchanges among competitors. López Obrador criticized COFECE’s involvement, arguing that the agency protects private interests, and expressed his intention to propose its dissolution. Despite these criticisms, the government proceeded with the acquisition, adhering to the established conditions. In September 2024, it issued bonds totaling $1.49 billion to partially finance the purchase, underscoring the significance of this operation in the national energy strategy.[23]

II. PROPOSED CHANGES

Eliminating these autonomous bodies would weaken the state’s oversight capabilities and reduce protections for citizens’ rights. Organizations like INAI and COFECE have responsibilities that require independence and impartiality to avoid conflicts of interest and to ensure public access to crucial information and competition in key sectors. Shutting them down and transferring their functions to the Executive Branch could concentrate too much power there, risking the impartiality and autonomy needed to protect citizens’ rights.

The right to access information is fundamental in a democratic system because it enables accountability and supports freedom of expression as a public good.

This right is recognized in Article 6 of the Mexican Constitution and in various international treaties. Notably, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has affirmed that Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights includes the right of every person to request access to information held by the state (see the ruling in the Gomes Lund et al. (“Guerrilha do Araguaia”) v. Brazil case, Judgment of November 24, 2010, Series C No. 219, paras. 106 and 107).

In some precedents[24], the Mexican Supreme Court has highlighted key aspects of the right to access information and to free speech, which are closely tied to having an institution like INAI.

The elimination of the INAI and state transparency oversight bodies would transfer responsibility for access to information and data protection to various government institutions, such as the Ministry of Public Administration and the congressional comptrollers. This shift would limit accountability and access to information, thereby affecting transparency in public functions. Additionally, this measure might jeopardize Mexico’s anti-corruption commitments under the USMCA (Chapter 27) and restrict civil society participation by complicating information requests and removing an independent oversight body.

Mexico’s economic competitiveness faces significant risks if competition decisions are centralized within the Executive Branch, as this could undermine impartiality and investor confidence. The elimination of specialized and independent bodies, such as COFECE, threatens to erode legal certainty and the necessary conditions for competition based on technical criteria. Moreover, this could place Mexico in breach of its obligations under the USMCA, whose Chapters 18 and 21 require independent and impartial regulatory bodies to ensure fair treatment for companies from member countries.

III. CITY BAR URGES MEXICAN AUTHORITIES TO UPHOLD THE INDEPENDENCE OF AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES

The New York City Bar Association calls on the Mexican government and legislators to reconsider this proposal and to prioritize strengthening transparency and accountability mechanisms. A broad, inclusive debate with civil society, experts, and international organizations is essential to fully evaluate the impact of these measures and to preserve democratic principles, transparency, and human rights gains in Mexico. Any structural change that compromises the independence of these agencies’ risks destabilizing the democratic balance and eroding public trust in institutions.

The proposal to eliminate Mexico’s autonomous agencies has sparked international concern, as these bodies are key pillars of democracy and the rule of law. Concentrating power in a single branch of government contradicts best practices recommended by international organizations that advocate for the separation of powers and institutional checks and balances. Such concentration threatens human rights and the independence of the legal profession, a direct concern for the New York City Bar Association, as it affects impartiality and independence in legal practice.

This shift would mean the government assumes supervisory and regulatory roles that were once independent, undermining legal certainty as the Executive Branch could unilaterally make decisions on economic competition, access to information, and data protection. Without these agencies, there would be no impartial oversight to regulate and sanction actions by both government and private entities, creating uncertainty around the enforcement of rights and regulations that impacts both citizens and businesses.

This interconnected effect could harm the business climate in Mexico. These agencies provide a predictable and transparent regulatory environment, which is crucial for both foreign and domestic investment. Without independent oversight, the private sector might perceive a lack of transparency and competitiveness, leading to distrust and discouraging investment at a time when legal certainty is essential for Mexico’s economic growth. This could impact the economy by reducing the secure environment investors need to operate in fair, regulated markets.

The New York City Bar Association therefore calls on Mexican authorities to uphold fundamental rights, respect institutional independence, and ensure that any reforms align with democratic principles and international standards. [25]

Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice
Jaime Chávez Alor, Associate Executive Director/Member, Committee on Inter-American Affairs and Working Group on the Independence of Lawyers and Judges

Cuitlahuac Castillo Camarena, Institutionality Program Advisor

Committee on Inter-American Affairs
Jessenia Vazcones-Yagual, Chairperson

November 2024

Footnotes

[1] CNN, “Organismos autónomos desaparecerán en México.” November 13, 2024. Available at: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/11/13/organismos-autonomos-desapareceran-mexico-orix. (All websites last accessed on November 27, 2024).

[2] Jorge Vaquero Simancas, El País. “Claudia Sheinbaum sobre la desaparición del INAI: ‘No tiene ningún sentido que permanezca.’” October 30, 2024. Available at: https://elpais.com/mexico/2024-10-30/claudia-sheinbaum-sobre-la-desaparicion-del-inai-no-tiene-ningun-sentido-que-permanezca.html.

[3] Rodrigo Camarena González et al., “Deconstructing To Reconstruct: An Analysis of Autonomous Constitutional Agencies in Mexico,” Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, new series, vol. LIV, no. 160, January-April 2021, pp. 62-71. Available at: https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/derecho-comparado/article/view/15971/16801.

[4] Wired, “ONU expresa su preocupación por la posible desaparición del INAI en México.” September 3, 2024 https://es.wired.com/articulos/onu-expresa-su-preocupacion-por-la-posible-desaparicion-del-inai-en-mexico. And Mexico Business News. “INAI’s dissolution threatens Mexico’s digital rights.” September 6, 2024. https://mexicobusiness.news/tech/news/inais-dissolution-threatens-mexicos-digital-rights.

[5] Cámara de Diputados, Comunicación Social, “Comisión de Puntos Constitucionales aprobó dictamen que plantea la extinción de siete organismos autónomos.” August 23, 2024 https://comunicacionsocial.diputados.gob.mx/index.php/boletines/comision-de-puntos-constitucionales-aprobo-dictamen-que-plantea-la-extincion-de-siete-organismos-autonomos-.

[6] Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales (INAI). Official website: https://home.inai.org.mx/.

[7] Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL). Official website: https://www.coneval.org.mx/.

[8] Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones (IFT). Official website: https://www.ift.org.mx/.

[9] Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica (COFECE). Official website: https://www.cofece.mx/.

[10] Comisión Nacional para la Mejora Continua de la Educación (Mejoredu). Official website: https://www.gob.mx/mejoredu.

[11] Comisión Reguladora de Energía (CRE). Official website: https://www.gob.mx/cre.

[12] Latinus. “AMLO asegura que se ahorrarán 100 mil mdp al año con la eliminación de organismos autónomos; arremete contra el INAI: ‘Es pura tapadera.’” July 11, 2024. https://latinus.us/mexico/2024/7/11/amlo-asegura-que-se-ahorraran-100-mil-mdp-al-ano-con-la-eliminacion-de-organismos-autonomos-arremete-contra-el-inai-es-pura-tapadera-118963.html.

[13] M-X. “Los otros datos de AMLO disparan quejas en transparencia, pero esconde menos información.” February 27, 2020. Available at: https://m-x.com.mx/al-dia/los-otros-datos-de-amlo-disparan-quejas-en-transparencia-pero-esconde-menos-informacion/.

[14] El Sol de México. “Aumenta opacidad de información casi tres veces en primer año de AMLO.”  January 22, 2020. Available at: https://www.elsoldemexico.com.mx/mexico/sociedad/aumenta-opacidad-de-informacion-casi-tres-veces-en-primer-ano-de-amlo-4736488.html.

[15] Capital 21 CDMX. “Noticias.” April 28, 2020. Available at:  https://www.capital21.cdmx.gob.mx/noticias/?p=18774.

[16] Contralínea. “INAI investiga al presidente AMLO y pide a Contralínea revelar sus fuentes.” September 15, 2024. Available at: https://contralinea.com.mx/interno/semana/inai-investiga-al-presidente-amlo-y-pide-a-contralinea-revelar-sus-fuentes/.

[17] INAI. “Respuesta a carta enviada por AMLO.” April 2022. Available at: https://micrositios.inai.org.mx/todasytodos/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/respuesta_carta_inai_amlo.pdf.

[18] Infobae. “INAI ordenó sancionar a AMLO por dar a conocer datos sensibles de Carlos Loret de Mola.” August 18, 2022. https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2022/08/18/inai-ordeno-sancionar-a-amlo-por-dar-a-conocer-datos-sensibles-de-carlos-loret-de-mola/.

[19] Infobae. “AMLO se burla de la estructura interna del INAI; pide a la SEGOB que investigue: ‘Es un desbarajuste.’” November 30, 2023. https://www.infobae.com/mexico/2023/11/30/amlo-se-burla-de-estructura-interna-del-inai-pide-a-la-segob-que-investigue-es-un-desbarajuste/.

[20] Secretaría de Gobernación. “Iniciativas de reforma a la Constitución.” February 16, 2024, https://www.gob.mx/segob/articulos/iniciativas-de-reforma-a-la-constitucion-358083.

[21] Animal Político. “COFECE vs. AMLO: energía y freno a inversión privada.” June 2020. https://www.animalpolitico.com/2020/06/cofece-amlo-energia-frenar-inversion-privada.

[22] Latinus. “AMLO reitera que la COFECE y el IFT deben desaparecer: ‘Ya no nos va a dar tiempo, lamenta.’” February 15, 2022. https://latinus.us/mexico/2022/2/15/amlo-reitera-que-la-cofece-el-ift-deben-desaparecer-ya-no-nos-va-dar-tiempo-nosotros-lamenta-58799.html.

[23] Forbes. “Gobierno de AMLO cierra la compra de 13 plantas de Iberdrola por 6,200 MDD.” February 26, 2024. Available at: https://forbes.com.mx/gobierno-de-amlo-cierra-la-compra-de-13-plantas-de-iberdrola-por-6200-mdd/.

[24] See the action of unconstitutionality 45/2016, ruled on April 9, 2019. The Supreme Court had pointed the following elements about the right to access information: 1) This is a right available to everyone, with no need to show direct interest or personal impact to obtain it, 2) This right imposes two positive obligations on the State: to provide the requested information or, if it cannot be disclosed due to an exception, to give a reasoned response to the request, 3) The right of access applies to information held by any authority, entity, branch, or body of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches, autonomous bodies, political parties, trusts, and public funds, as well as any individual, organization, or union that receives and uses public resources or performs acts of authority at the federal, state, or municipal levels, 4) The State’s actions must follow the principle of maximum disclosure, with only limited exceptions, 5) An effective administrative process for handling and responding to information requests must be in place, with set timelines for response and information delivery, 6) There must be a simple, quick, and effective remedy to determine if there has been a violation of the requester’s right, and if so, to direct the appropriate body to provide the information, 7) If the right of access to information is not yet guaranteed, the State is obligated to adopt legislative or other measures necessary to make it effective and to remove any norms or practices that hinder its fulfillment.

[25] Forbes. “Sheinbaum debe dar seguridad y certeza jurídica para que llegue más inversión: COPARMEX.” October 1, 2024. Available at: https://forbes.com.mx/sheinbaum-debe-dar-seguridad-y-certeza-juridica-para-que-llegue-mas-inversion-coparmex/