Statement on the Removal Proceedings Against 56 Judges in Chile and the Importance of Judicial Independence

REPORT

STATEMENT EXPRESSING CONCERNS OVER REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST 56 JUDGES AND THE RISKS TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHILE

The New York City Bar Association (“City Bar”)[1] expresses concern over the recent removal proceedings initiated against 56 judges by the Chilean government and the harm that this maneuver signifies to due process guarantees and judicial independence in Chile. This statement is part of the City Bar’s broader concern regarding the weakening of judicial independence in Latin America[2], which has manifested itself through defamation campaigns, threats and attacks against judges, and budget cuts that deprive the judiciary of essential financial resources[3]. Due process is an important component of judicial independence recognized in Principles 17, 18, 19, and 20 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary of the United Nations, which guarantee that if a charge or complaint is made against a judge, they shall have the right to a fair hearing, and all disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be determined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct.[4]

The City Bar’s latest concern arises from the Supreme Court of Chile’s exercise of its constitutional power to remove judges under Article 80 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile, following its decision in June 2026 to initiate removal proceedings against 56 judges, in circumstances where the same facts had already been examined and resolved through disciplinary proceedings conducted under Act No. 108-2020 of the Supreme Court. This situation raises serious questions regarding compliance with international standards protecting judicial independence, due process, legal certainty, security of tenure, and the principle of ne bis in idem, which prohibits repeated proceedings or sanctions based on the same facts once a matter has been definitively resolved.[5]

I. BACKGROUND

The current situation has its roots in a report from the Comptroller General of the Republic of Chile, in which it was reported that public officials from all branches of government had traveled abroad while on approved medical leave between 2022 and 2024.[6]

Based on this information, the Supreme Court ordered a review of cases involving judges whose travel had occurred within the preceding five years. As a result, disciplinary investigations were initiated in different jurisdictions throughout the country to determine whether such conduct constituted breaches of official duties, giving rise to administrative liability.

These investigations were conducted pursuant to Act No. 108-2020, a regulatory instrument adopted by the Supreme Court governing disciplinary proceedings against judges.[7] The Act establishes procedural guarantees, investigative rules, and limitations on the exercise of disciplinary authority, including a statute of limitations period for disciplinary liability.

The disciplinary investigations resulted in different outcomes depending on the circumstances of each case: i) disciplinary liability was declared time-barred; ii) judges were acquitted, or proceedings were dismissed; iii) sanctions were imposed, became final, and were fully served by the affected judges.

At that stage, the proceedings had reached their legal conclusion under the disciplinary framework established by the Supreme Court itself. The decisions issued had produced their corresponding legal effects, and the affected judges reasonably understood that the matters had been definitively resolved.

However, in June 2026, despite the conclusion of these disciplinary proceedings, the Supreme Court initiated new proceedings to examine the possible removal of several judges pursuant to Article 80 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile.  That article authorizes the Supreme Court to declare that judges “have not had good behavior” and to order their removal under the conditions established in the Constitution.[8]

The latest removal proceedings are based on the same factual circumstances that had already been examined in the disciplinary proceedings governed by Act No. 108-2020 which have since concluded. This fact alone is cause for concern given the “double jeopardy” aspects of the proceedings.  Even more concerning is the fact that, unlike the Act No. 108-2020 proceedings, the removal proceedings seem to lack due process.  In short, the initiation of removal proceedings based on the same factual circumstances that had already been examined and resolved has generated concerns regarding legal certainty, due process, security of tenure, and the prohibition against repeated proceedings based on the same conduct.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has expressed alarm over the possible removal of these judges under undefined proceedings that do not appear to ensure due process, expressing that “Chile should find more effective ways to strengthen public confidence in the judicial system, and reject retroactive and sweeping disciplinary measures. Clear rules with due process protections are essential to ensuring both judicial independence and integrity.”[9]

II. CONCERNS

Reopening matters that had already been legally resolved undermines the guarantees of legal certainty and finality. Article 6 of Act No. 108-2020 establishes that disciplinary actions expire after two years from the occurrence of the relevant conduct, except where the facts may constitute a crime or ordinary offense, in which case the applicable criminal limitation period applies.[10] This limitation period constitutes an essential guarantee of legal certainty.

If a time-barred investigation can nonetheless serve as grounds for removal; if an acquittal or dismissal does not represent effective legal closure; or if a sanction that has already been served can be followed by new proceedings before the sane tribunal seeking harsher sanctions based on the same facts, then legal certainty ceases to operate as an effective limit on the exercise of disciplinary power, and judicial independence loses one of its essential safeguards.

A particularly serious situation arises with respect to judges who exercised their right to appeal the disciplinary sanctions imposed on them. In those cases, the Supreme Court reviewed and decided the appeals within the disciplinary proceedings governed by Act No. 108-2020, upheld the sanctions imposed by the Courts of Appeal, and rendered the disciplinary decisions final. However, in the same rulings, the Court also ordered the opening of proceedings to examine the possible removal of the affected judges based on the very same facts that had just been reviewed.

In this way, the review mechanism established under Act No. 108-2020 risks losing its effectiveness, as the exercise of the right to appeal may expose judges to the possibility of a more severe consequence than the one addressed in the original disciplinary proceeding. This raises concerns regarding due process guarantees, the final and binding character of disciplinary decisions, and the principle of ne bis in idem in disciplinary matters.

The institutional implications of these developments are further heightened by opinions issued by members of the Supreme Court advocating an expansive interpretation of the Court’s powers under Article 80 of the Constitution,[11] in conjunction with Article 540 of the Organic Code of Courts.[12] In a recent decision, two justices proposed that the Supreme Court should not limit itself to resolving the appeals brought under Act No. 108-2020, nor merely take notice of the disciplinary proceedings reported to it, but instead exercise its constitutional supervisory powers more broadly. Under this approach, the Court would not only examine the conduct of the investigated judges, but would also review whether the Courts of Appeal had appropriately assessed the seriousness of the facts and whether they had imposed disciplinary measures commensurate with that gravity.[13]

The proposal went even further. The justices maintained that, where a Court of Appeal had failed to exercise, or had abusively exercised, the discretionary disciplinary powers conferred upon it by law, the Supreme Court should be able to admonish or censure that court and, where appropriate, open removal proceedings against the judges concerned.[14] Such an approach raises serious concerns regarding internal judicial independence, as it introduces a mechanism through which the disciplinary decisions adopted by the Courts of Appeal, in addition to being revisited or effectively overridden whenever their assessment of the facts differs from that of the highest court, will also trigger “admonishment or censure” by the Court. This risks creating a chilling effect on the independent exercise of judicial functions and weakening the decisional autonomy of higher courts within the judiciary.

In this regard, the facts described raise concerns regarding Chile’s compliance with international standards protecting judicial independence, including the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, the American Convention on Human Rights, particularly Articles 8, 9, and 25, the Ibero-American Statute of the Judge, and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights concerning judicial independence, security of tenure, and due process in disciplinary proceedings against judges.[15]

The situation in Chile is significant beyond the country itself because Chile has long been seen as a model of institutional stability in Latin America. The case raises broader concerns about whether the Supreme Court can reopen matters that have already been resolved through disciplinary proceedings, despite procedural safeguards such as statutes of limitations. It also draws attention to the concentration of judicial, disciplinary, and supervisory powers in the Chilean Supreme Court, highlighting the need for safeguards to protect judicial independence.

The City Bar emphasizes that the concern raised in this communication is not whether integrity should be required of those who exercise judicial authority—a matter on which there is no disagreement. Rather, the concern is whether the defense of judicial integrity can justify disregarding essential rule-of-law guarantees recognized as safeguards of judicial independence, including due process, legal certainty, security of tenure, and the finality of disciplinary proceedings.

III. THE CITY BAR CALLS FOR THE PROTECTION OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHILE

The City Bar urges the authorities of Chile to ensure that mechanisms of judicial accountability operate in accordance with international standards protecting judicial independence, due process, legal certainty, and security of tenure.

In particular, the City Bar calls on Chilean authorities to:

• Ensure that disciplinary and removal proceedings against judges respect due process guarantees and the finality of decisions adopted under established procedures;
• Guarantee that statutes of limitations, acquittals, dismissals, and completed sanctions have meaningful legal effect and provide certainty to judges subject to disciplinary proceedings;
• Ensure that the exercise of judicial review mechanisms, including appeals, does not expose judges to additional or more severe consequences based on the same facts;
• Protect the internal independence of courts by ensuring that disciplinary mechanisms are not used in a manner that undermines the autonomy of judges and higher courts in the exercise of their functions.

The City Bar also respectfully calls on the international human rights bodies, including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, to continue to closely monitor the situation in Chile.

Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice
Jaime Chávez Alor, Co-Executive Director
Cuitlahuac Castillo Camarena, Program Advisor for Institutional Integrity
Aizhan Kurmanalieva, Legal Fellow of the Human Rights & Access to Justice Program

Task Force on the Independence of Lawyers and Judges
Christopher Ferguson

Inter-American Affairs Committee
Alexis J. Colón
Jose Enrique Arvelo