Committee Reports

Statement Expressing Concerns Over Actions Undermining Judicial Independence In Brazil

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SUMMARY

The New York City Bar Association (“City Bar”) expresses grave concern about recent actions by the United States Government that directly undermine judicial independence in Brazil. In July 2025, the Trump administration imposed visa restrictions and other sanctions on Brazilian judicial officials, including Supreme Federal Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes and his family, and imposed punitive trade tariffs on Brazilian imports, following Brazilian court decisions involving former President Jair Bolsonaro.

The measures, characterized by top government officials as a response to an alleged “political witch hunt” against former President Bolsonaro, directly interfere with Brazil’s judiciary and violate international standards on judicial independence. Among others, these standards require that judges be free from external pressures or retaliation for their rulings.

While former President Bolsonaro’s conviction has drawn global attention, the City Bar is concerned that punitive actions against Brazilian judges may set a troubling precedent, fostering international political pressure that threatens judicial independence and discourages judges from handling politically sensitive cases.

The City Bar condemns this intrusion as an effort to undermine Brazil’s rule of law and national sovereignty. We call for the immediate reversal of these visa restrictions and sanctions. We further urge full respect for the autonomy of Brazil’s judiciary, in line with established international principles that protect judges from intimidation, persecution, or retaliation. Finally, we encourage all relevant authorities and international bodies to ensure that Brazil’s judiciary can carry out its constitutional duties effectively, impartially, and without fear of reprisal.

REPORT

STATEMENT EXPRESSING CONCERNS OVER ACTIONS UNDERMINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN BRAZIL

The New York City Bar Association (“City Bar”)[1] expresses grave concern over recent actions taken by the United States government that undermine the independence of Brazil’s judiciary. These actions include visa restrictions, financial sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act, an increase in national tariffs against Brazil, and social media threats on Supreme Federal Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes and other judicial officials, in response to rulings related to the criminal prosecution of former President Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022). The City Bar calls for the immediate reversal of these measures, as they violate international standards on judicial independence, amount to political retaliation for lawful judicial decisions, and threaten the integrity of Brazil’s rule of law and sovereignty.

In July 2025, the U.S. Department of State imposed visa restrictions[2] on Supreme Federal Court (“SFC”)[3] Justice Alexandre de Moraes, several officials, and their families, followed by additional sanctions[4] by the Department of the Treasury, and an Executive Order[5] imposing punitive tariffs on Brazilian imports. The measures were explicitly framed as retaliation for judicial rulings not only related to the January 2023 attacks on federal government buildings in Brazil’s capital, but also involving broader actions connected to an attempted coup against democracy and the rule of law. These rulings included the criminal prosecution of former President Bolsonaro (2019-2022) and others involved.

These measures amount to improper political pressure and retaliation against judges for the content of their decisions. Such actions contravene international standards on judicial independence, including the United Nations (“UN“) Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary[6]  and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which prohibits interference with or punishment of judges for carrying out their constitutional and legal duties.

While former President Bolsonaro’s conviction has drawn global attention, the City Bar is concerned that punitive actions against Brazilian judges may set a troubling precedent, fostering international political pressure that threatens judicial independence and discourages judges from handling politically sensitive cases.

The City Bar expresses deep concern over these actions and calls for full respect for Brazil’s judicial autonomy, which is consistent with international law and the rule of law.

I. Background

In 2023, the Supreme Electoral Court [7] intensified the use of its existing authority to compel social media platforms to remove content and accounts disseminating disinformation, aiming to protect Brazil’s “young democracy.”[8] As early as 2022, Justice Alexandre de Moraes, then president of the Supreme Electoral Court, issued orders requiring social media platforms, including X (formerly Twitter), to take down accounts and content for violating hate speech and disinformation policies.[9] These measures intensified in 2024 amid ongoing investigations into threats to democratic institutions. After the company failed to comply with court orders, Justice de Moraes ordered daily fines and demanded that X designate a legal representative in Brazil, as required under the country’s Internet Law. When the company refused to do so, he authorized further coercive measures, including the potential arrest of local X representatives, and ultimately ordered the suspension of X’s operations in Brazil. The platform later agreed to comply with the rulings, and access to X in Brazil was restored.[10]

In February 2025, Brazil’s Attorney General announced formal criminal charges against former President Bolsonaro for his alleged role in the attempted coup.[11] Concretely, SFC’s Justice de Moraes oversaw investigations and prosecutions related to the aftermath of Brazil’s 2022 elections and the ensuing January 2023 insurrection.[12] These cases include, but are not limited to, indictments brought against former President Bolsonaro and seven co-defendants for alleged attempts to disrupt the democratic process.[13]

Since the commencement of the judicial proceeding, former President Bolsonaro’s supporters have tried to undermine the legitimacy of the trial. In a letter sent on July 9, 2025, to Brazilian President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, U.S. President Trump labeled the trial as: “…a Witch Hunt (sic.) that should end IMMEDIATELY!”[14] On July 18, 2025, after identifying “…material for social media that contained the same illegal messages for which the precautionary measures had been imposed,”[15], Justice de Moraes issued new orders barring former President Bolsonaro from “…contacting foreign officials, using social media or approaching embassies.”[16] The SFC issued the restrictions amid evidence that former President Bolsonaro sought the intervention of the U.S. government in connection with the investigations. In the ruling, Justice de Moraes vindicated the restrictions by citing “…a ‘concrete’ possibility that [former President] Bolsonaro would flee the country.”[17]

In response to the SFC’s decision, the U.S. administration intervened. On the same day as the SFC announced the restrictions against Bolsonaro, the Department of State imposed immediate visa revocations for Justice de Moraes, “…his allies on the court, as well as their immediate family members”.[18] In a press statement, Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the SFC’s actions as a “political witch hunt” against former President Bolsonaro and accused Justice de Moraes of creating “…a persecution and censorship complex so sweeping that it not only violates basic rights of Brazilians, but also extends beyond Brazil’s shores to target Americans.”[19] He alleged that the actions impacted Brazilians as well as Americans, signaling that, in certain cases, the Secretary of State will take into account the impacts on non-citizens as one basis for the application of visa restrictions.

Shortly thereafter, on July 30, 2025, President Trump escalated U.S. action by signing an Executive Order declaring a national emergency with respect to Brazil and imposing an additional 40% tariff on Brazilian imports. It explicitly tied the tariff spike to Brazil’s judicial proceedings[20] and alleged that the Brazilian Government undertook a “…politically motivated persecution, intimidation, harassment, censorship, and prosecution of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and thousands of his supporters…” and that these measures constitute “…an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”[21]

The Executive Order also mentioned Justice de Moraes by name, and argued that he “…has abused his judicial authority to target political opponents, shield corrupt allies, and suppress dissent, often in coordination with other Brazilian officials.”[22] Additionally, it accused Brazilian authorities of coercing U.S.-based companies into censoring content in ways that infringe on free expression and U.S. business interests.[23] Among the allegations, the Executive Order asserts that Justice de Moraes ordered raids, arrests, and asset freezes against former President Bolsonaro’s allies, issued secret orders to U.S. social media companies to remove posts by American users, and even sought the prosecution of a U.S. resident for speech expressed on U.S. soil.[24]

The U.S. government claims that the sanctions are intended to defend U.S. companies from “extortion,” protect free speech from foreign “censorship,” and hold a foreign judge accountable for alleged human rights abuses.[25]

The same day, the Department of the Treasury announced additional sanctions against Justice de Moraes.[26] According to the Treasury’s press release, Justice de Moraes is accused of orchestrating a campaign of repression that includes arbitrary detentions, politically motivated prosecutions, and censorship of protected speech.

Brazilian leaders have firmly rejected the U.S. actions.[27] President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva responded by stating that “Brazil has a Constitution (sic.), and the former president is being tried with a full right to a defense.”[28] The Brazilian judiciary, for its part, has continued to carry out its duties. Following a trial that drew intense attention in Brazil and around the world, on September 11, 2025, a majority of the SFC issued a landmark judgment convicting former President Bolsonaro of plotting a coup to remain in power after losing the 2022 elections. Four of five justices voted to convict former President Bolsonaro of five crimes: taking part in an armed criminal organization; attempting to violently abolish democracy; organizing a coup; damaging government property; and damaging protected cultural assets.[29] This was the first time in Brazil’s history that a former head of state was found guilty of attacking democracy.

After the trial, on September 22, 2025, Reuters reported that the U.S. administration extended these measures by sanctioning Justice de Moraes’ wife, Viviane Barci de Moraes, as well as a family-linked financial entity, and by revoking the visas of six additional Brazilian judicial officials.[30] The fact that these sanctions targeted a judge’s family member after the conviction had already been issued underscores that intimidation efforts have not ceased, but instead have escalated, further aggravating the risks to judicial independence and sovereignty.

The City Bar remains deeply concerned that the actions taken to sanction Brazilian judges could set a precedent that contributes to a broader dynamic of international political pressure on judges. Such a dynamic risks undermining the essential guarantees of judicial independence and could deter judges from carrying out their duties in politically sensitive cases. Therefore, in the following sections, we will examine the specific pressures exerted against Justice de Moraes and analyze how these actions measure against international standards on judicial independence.

II. Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the INA

The Department of State imposed visa restrictions under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”), which allows denying entry to foreigners whose activities “…would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States.”[31]

The INA affords the U.S. Secretary of State wide discretion to bar individuals from entry to the United States. Courts generally defer to Executive determinations of foreign policy, and non-citizens have limited rights to visas for entry to the United States. Individuals who believe that the restriction incorrectly targeted them may choose to make their case to the Department of State informally.

In practice, however, the actions appear to be punishment against Justice de Moraes and other Brazilian judicial officials for judgments rendered in the cases involving former President Bolsonaro, as outlined in the following section.

III. Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act

Justice de Moraes was sanctioned on July 30 under Executive Order 13818, which implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.

The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, enacted in 2016, empowers the U.S. government to impose sanctions on foreign individuals and entities involved in serious human rights abuses or significant corruption. Unlike traditional sanctions that target governments or broad sectors, the Global Magnitsky Act is designed to hold specific perpetrators accountable, regardless of their nationality or official status. It allows for visa bans and asset freezes against those responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, repression of free speech, or large-scale corruption that undermines democratic institutions.

One of the Act’s defining features is its global scope. It builds on the original Magnitsky Act, which focused on Russian officials implicated in the death of whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky, and expands its reach to all countries. The Act is implemented through Executive Order 13818, which broadens the criteria for sanctions and enables the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to designate individuals and entities. Once designated, these persons are effectively cut off from the U.S. financial system, and U.S. persons are prohibited from conducting business with them.

The Act has become a powerful tool in U.S. foreign policy, used to promote accountability and deter abuses without resorting to military or diplomatic confrontation. By targeting individuals rather than entire nations, the Global Magnitsky Act aims to minimize harm to innocent populations while exerting pressure on those who violate international norms.

This sanction results in “…all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked person described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.”[32] It triggers a series of financial and legal consequences designed to isolate the sanctioned individual from the U.S. and, often, the broader international financial system. Specifically, the sanctions freeze any assets the individual may hold in the United States. This means that any bank accounts, real estate, investments, or other financial interests under U.S. jurisdiction are immediately blocked. U.S. persons—including individuals, banks, companies, and nonprofits—are prohibited from engaging in any transactions with the sanctioned person. This includes direct financial dealings, provision of services, or even facilitating transactions on their behalf.

Because the U.S. financial system is deeply interconnected with global banking networks, these sanctions often have extraterritorial effects. Many non-U.S. institutions voluntarily comply to avoid secondary sanctions or losing access to U.S. markets. As a result, the sanctioned individual(s) may find themselves cut off from international banking, unable to use credit cards, transfer funds, or engage in cross-border commerce. In essence, these measures are designed to exert maximum financial pressure without force—isolating the individual economically and diplomatically and signaling to others that such conduct carries serious consequences.

Of particular concern is the use of the Global Magnitsky Act as a tool to retaliate against independent judicial decisions issued in other democracies. The Act was designed to address egregious cases of human rights abuses and corruption, not to penalize judges for the exercise of their judicial functions. Expanding its application undermines the credibility of the Act itself and dilutes its intended role as a mechanism of accountability for grave misconduct. It is true that this is not the first time the Act has been applied against judges: in 2023, it was used against Judge Elena Anatolievna Lenskaya in Russia, and in 2020 against Judges Moses Mukiibi and Wilson Musalu Musene in Uganda. However, these precedents occurred in countries that cannot be characterized as democracies, where the judiciary does not operate as a truly independent branch, but rather as an extension of the state apparatus itself. As recorded in the Global Magnitsky Reports of 2023 and 2020[33], these cases involved contexts in which judges acted as instruments of repression or were implicated in clear corruption schemes, not situations where legitimate judicial independence was at stake. This contrast highlights the risk of extending the Act to democracies. In such cases, using sanctions to punish judges for their rulings amounts to attempts at intimidation based on mere disagreement with those rulings.

It is important to clarify that this statement does not dispute the objectives or legal foundation of the Global Magnitsky Act. The Act plays a critical role in the global effort to combat grave human rights abuses and corruption, and its responsible application can serve as a powerful deterrent against impunity. However, the case of Brazil presents a substantially more complex scenario than the contexts in which the Act has been previously invoked. The sanctions against Justice Alexandre de Moraes occurred in a democratic setting, during the course of a constitutionally authorized criminal trial against a former president and were accompanied by a series of coercive actions—including visa revocations, trade threats for the whole country, and public denunciations—whose cumulative effect suggests an intent to exert political pressure rather than ensure anticorruption accountability. These contextual factors raise serious concerns that the Act was used in a manner inconsistent with its original purpose and previous cases, blurring the line between legitimate sanctions policy and interference in the independent exercise of judicial functions.

Judges must be free to decide cases based on the law and evidence, even when their decisions are unpopular or politically sensitive. It must be underscored that disagreements with judicial decisions must be addressed through lawful avenues of appeal or review within the domestic legal system, not through unilateral sanctions.

IV. Threats to Judicial Independence Under International Standards

The independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of the rule of law and is protected by both universal and regional international standards. A fundamental principle of international law is that judges must be free to decide cases impartially, without external pressure or fear of reprisals. The UN Basic Principle on the Independence of the Judiciary (“Basic Principle”) 2 provides that “[t]he judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.”[34] The City Bar believes that by imposing personal sanctions on sitting judges for actions taken in their official judicial capacity, the U.S. government directly undermines this principle.

Institutional reprisals against Brazilian court officials seek to pressure and punish them solely in connection with the content of their court rulings. These government-sanctioned actions remain clear examples of the “interferences” and “threats” from external sources that the Basic Principles forbid. Additionally, interference not only endangers the individual judicial officers targeted, but also has the potential to create chilling effects or improperly influence other judges deciding high-profile or politically sensitive cases in Brazil and elsewhere. Finally, as a general matter, the U.S. Government’s actions undermine the public’s trust in the judiciary’s independence and impartiality.

Regional Human Rights standards in the Americas likewise underscore that judges must be insulated from punitive actions for their judicial decisions. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), in cases like Apitz Barbera v. Venezuela, held that “…the suspension or removal of judges can only be justified for valid reasons such as misconduct or incompetence, and never simply because a judicial decision has been overturned by a higher court.”[35] In other words, the content of judicial rulings, if made in good faith and within their jurisdiction, must not serve as grounds for sanction. Thus, disciplinary or punitive measures are to be reserved for genuine wrongdoing (e.g., corruption) and must always respect due process.

Although the U.S. measures cannot be considered as formally disciplinary or within Brazilian jurisdiction, they are punitive in effect and retaliatory in nature. As the IACtHR has emphasized, judicial independence is compromised when judges are sanctioned for adopting legally plausible interpretations of the law in their decisions, even if those decisions are contentious, unpopular, or later reversed. In the cases regarding former President Bolsonaro, the SFC’s decisions were issued pursuant to Brazilian law and, upheld by an appellate panel. When a foreign government responds to a judicial ruling of another sovereign state with political punishment, it directly contravenes the principle that judicial resolutions should be contested only through lawful appellate and review procedures, not by targeting the judges involved in their individual capacity.

Furthermore, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers has cautioned against the misuse of disciplinary measures or, by extension, any punitive pressures as a tool to influence judicial outcomes. In its July 2020 report to the UN General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur stressed that only cases of manifest and inexcusable professional misconduct by judges should lead to sanctions, and even then, only consistent with the safeguards of due process. The Special Rapporteur stated that “[j]udges should not be subject to disciplinary sanctions as a consequence of the content of their decisions, except in cases of deliberate misconduct.”[36]

The U.S. government has not alleged that Justice de Moraes engaged in any improper conduct outside his judicial role. Instead, the grievance explicitly pertains to the content of his rulings, in a case where the U.S. government is neither a party nor has jurisdiction over the issues at stake. According to the UN guidelines, any disagreements with judicial decisions must be addressed via legal channels, not by inflicting extrajudicial and extraterritorial penalties on the judge. By revoking individual visas, freezing assets, and imposing tariffs, the U.S. measures amount to an attempt to intimidate and punish a judge for exercising official judicial functions. These measures are incompatible with the principle of judicial independence upheld by international bodies such as the UN and the Organization of American States.

It is also important to note that the recent actions of the U.S. administration disregard the sovereign equality of nations and the domestic separation of powers in Brazil. Under international law, including Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, States have the obligation not to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries.[37] Hence, the U.S. administration’s direct targeting of Brazilian judicial officials likely constitutes a troubling breach of diplomatic norms and cooperative international relations.

These concerns are shared broadly: on September 17, 2025, a coalition of U.S. civil society organizations—including Washington Office on Latin America, Amazon Watch, Latin America Working Group, Center for Economic and Policy Research, and Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights—issued a joint statement rejecting the Trump administration’s use of sanctions and tariffs to pressure Brazil’s judiciary. The organizations stressed that Brazil’s judiciary acted with due process and provided a robust institutional response to an attempted coup, similar to accountability processes in the U.S. after January 6, 2021. The statement underlines that former President Bolsonaro’s conviction should be recognized as a sign of democratic strength in Brazil rather than mischaracterized as weakness. The organizations urged the U.S. government to cease attempts to interfere in Brazil’s judicial processes and to respect free and fair elections in 2026.[38]

V. The City Bar Calls on the U.S. Government to Respect the Independence of Brazil’s Judiciary

The City Bar condemns the actions of the U.S. administration that intrude upon and undermine Brazil’s rule of law and national sovereignty, including the Trump administration-imposed visa restrictions and other sanctions on Brazilian judicial officials, particularly Supreme Federal Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes and his family, as well as punitive trade tariffs levied on Brazilian imports. We call for the immediate reversal of all U.S. visa restrictions and sanctions in response to the judicial proceedings involving former President Bolsonaro. The City Bar urges the U.S. government to immediately cease any form of interference, retaliation, sanctions, or pressure against members of Brazil’s judiciary.

We call on the U.S. government to fully respect the autonomy and independence of Brazil’s judiciary, in accordance with Brazil’s constitution and international law. Judges must be allowed to duly perform their duties free from external pressure (domestically or from abroad). Any concerns the U.S. has about legal proceedings in Brazil should be addressed through appropriate diplomatic channels or via collaborative frameworks, not through unilateral coercive actions. The U.S., as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to the UN Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, should uphold the principle that the judiciary is an independent pillar of government that must be free from political interference. We note that safeguarding judicial independence ultimately strengthens the rule of law, which is in the interest of both Brazil and the U.S.

We urge the Departments of State and Treasury to align their conduct with international standards on judicial independence, such as those articulated by the UN Special Rapporteur, the Basic Principles, the Inter-American human rights system, and domestic precedents  regard judicial independence as “…a core political value in the United States since the founding of the republic.”[39]

We also respectfully call on international human rights bodies, including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, to monitor and assess this situation closely. International oversight is an essential step to ensure that judicial actors are not subject to political retaliation in Brazil or elsewhere. International observers should remain vigilant and speak out against any measures that jeopardize the independence of judges in Brazil.

Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice
Cuitlahuac Castillo Camarena, Program Advisor for Institutional Integrity Program

Task Force on the Independence of Lawyers and Judges
Matthew Diller, Chair

October 2025

Footnotes

[1] The New York City Bar Association (City Bar), founded in 1870, is an organization of more than 20,000 members in New York City and elsewhere throughout the United States and in more than 50 countries around the globe. Its members include judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, government lawyers, and public interest/non-governmental organization practitioners, as well as legal academics and attorneys representing nearly every major law firm and corporation in the United States. The City Bar has a long and distinguished history of promoting the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of legal professionals to fulfill their professional obligations. The Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice produced this Statement.

[2] US Department of State. Sanctioning Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes for Serious Human Rights Abuse. July 12, 2025. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/sanctioning-brazilian-supreme-court-justice-alexandre-de-moraes-for-serious-human-rights-abuse (All websites last accessed on Oct. 24, 2025).

[3] Supremo Tribunal Federal, in Portuguese. See more: Superior Tribunal de Justiça (Brazil), Supreme Federal Court, https://international.stj.jus.br/en/Brazilian-Judicial-Branch/Supreme-Federal-Court.

[4] US Department of the Treasury. Treasury Sanctions Alexandre de Moraes. July 30, 2025. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0211.

[5] U.S. White House, Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil, Executive Order, July 30, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/addressing-threats-to-the-us/.

[6] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-independence-judiciary.

[7] Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, in Portuguese. See more: Superior Electoral Court (Brazil), The Court. https://international.tse.jus.br/en/superior-electoral-court/the-court.

[8] Jack Nicas, Brazil’s Chief Justice: We Are Saving Democracy, New York Times. October 16, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/16/world/americas/brazil-chief-justice-supreme-court-power.html.

[9] Jack Nicas and Ana Ionava, Elon Musk’s X Backs Down in Brazil, New York Times. September 21, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/21/world/americas/elon-musk-x-brazil.html.

[10] CPI, X Returns to Brazil After Supreme Court Ruling Clears Path, Pymnts. April 10, 2024. https://www.pymnts.com/cpi-posts/x-returns-to-brazil-after-supreme-court-ruling-clears-path/.

[11] Daniel Carvalho, Bolsonaro Charged With Coup Attempt After His Election Loss, Bloomberg News. February 18, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-18/bolsonaro-charged-with-plotting-coup-after-election-loss-to-lula.

[12] Jones, Julia Vargas, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro on Trial: House Arrest, Coup Charges, and US Pressure Explained.” CNN. September 2, 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/02/americas/bolsonaro-trial-explained-intl-latam.

[13] Buschschlüter, Vanessa, “What You Need to Know about Bolsonaro’s Coup-Plot Trial.” BBC News, September 2, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy4d409v2neo.

[14] Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social, July 9, 2025, https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114825119138468153.

[15] Federico Rivas Molina, “Brazil’s Supreme Court Orders House Arrest for Jair Bolsonaro,” El País (English Edition), August 5, 2025, https://english.elpais.com/international/2025-08-05/brazils-supreme-court-orders-house-arrest-for-jair-bolsonaro.html.

[16] Brito, Ricardo, and Luciana Novaes Magalhães. 2025. “Brazil’s Top Court Orders Raids on Bolsonaro; Washington Revokes Judges’ Visa.” Reuters, July 18, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazils-top-court-orders-raids-bolsonaro-washington-revokes-judges-visa-2025-07-18/.

[17] Al Jazeera. “Brazil Authorities Raid Bolsonaro’s Home, Require Him to Wear Monitor.” Al Jazeera, July 18, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/18/brazil-police-raid-former-president-jair-bolsonaros-home-headquarters.

[18] US Department of State. 2025. Announcement of Visa Restrictions on Brazilian Judicial Officials and Their Immediate Family Members. July 18, 2025. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/announcement-of-visa-restrictions-on-brazilian-judicial-officials-and-their-immediate-family-members.

[19] Idem.

[20] U.S. White House, Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil, Executive Order, July 30, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/addressing-threats-to-the-us/.

[21] The White House, Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Threats to the United States from the Government of Brazil, July 30, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-addresses-threats-to-the-united-states-from-the-government-of-brazil/.

[22] U.S. White House, Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil, Executive Order, op. cit.

[23] Idem.

[24] Idem.

[25] US Embassy & Consulates in Brazil. President Donald J. Trump Addresses Threats to the United States from the Government of Brazil. July 31, 2025. https://br.usembassy.gov/president-donald-j-trump-addresses-threats-to-the-united-states-from-the-government-of-brazil/.

[26] US Department of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Alexandre de Moraes, July 30, 2025, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0211.

[27] Phillips, Tom. “President Lula Hits Back as Trump Tariffs Threaten US‑Brazil Trade Showdown.” The Guardian. July 30, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jul/30/us-brazil-lula-trump-tariffs.

[28] Nicas, Jack. “Brazil President on His Feud with Trump.” The New York Times, July 30, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/30/world/americas/brazil-president-lula-trump-feud-tariffs.html.

[29] Ricardo Brito, Luciana Novaes Magalhaes, and Manuela Andreoni, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro Guilty of Coup Charges, Court Majority Decides in Landmark Trial,” Reuters, September 11, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazils-bolsonaro-guilty-coup-charges-court-majority-decides-landmark-trial-2025-09-11/.

[30] Gram Slattery, “US Hits Brazilian Judge’s Wife with Sanctions as Trump Showdown Deepens,” Reuters, September 22, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-targets-wife-brazilian-supreme-court-justice-with-sanctions-2025-09-22/.

[31] Immigration and Nationality Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2025).

[32] US Department of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Alexandre de Moraes, July 30, 2025, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0211.

[33] US Department of State, Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act Annual Report 2020, January 4, 2021, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/04/2020-29015/global-magnitsky-human-rights-accountability-act-annual-report and US Department of State, Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act Annual Report 2023, February 23, 2024, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/02/23/2024-03532/global-magnitsky-human-rights-accountability-act-annual-report.

[34] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. Principle 2. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-independence-judiciary.

[35] Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Series C No. 182, https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_182_esp.pdf. Pages 22 to 28. See also: New York City Bar Association. Statement Expressing Concern over the Criminalization of Judges in Mexico. March 10, 2025. https://www.nycbar.org/reports/statement-expressing-concern-over-the-criminalization-of-judges-in-mexico/.

[36] García Sayán, Diego, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Report on Disciplinary Procedures and Judicial Independence. July 27, 2020. https://independenciajudicial.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Informe-RE-Garci%CC%81a-Saya%CC%81n-procedimientos-disciplinarios.pdf.

[37] Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 7, in Charter of the United Nations, adopted 1945 (San Francisco: United Nations), art. 2(7), https://legal.un.org/repertory/art2_7.shtml. Article 2(7): Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII

[38] Team WOLA, “U.S. Civil Society Raises Concern About the Implications of U.S. Attempts to Interfere in Brazilian Judicial Process,” Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), September 17, 2025, https://www.wola.org/2025/09/u-s-civil-society-raises-concern-about-the-implications-of-u-s-attempts-to-interfere-in-brazilian-judicial-process/.

[39] Mira Gur-Arie and Russell R. Wheeler, Judicial Independence in the United States: Current Issues and Relevant Background Information, Federal Judicial Center, 2001, https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/JudIndep.pdf.