Statement Expressing Concern Over New Law in Zimbabwe Imposing Restrictions on Civil Society Organizations
SUMMARY
The Vance Center for International Justice, the African Affairs Committee, the International Human Rights Committee and the Council on International Affairs expresses serious concern regarding the Private Voluntary Organisations (PVO) Amendment Act, signed into law by Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa on April 11, 2025. This law grants the government sweeping powers to restrict the registration and operations of civil society organizations (CSOs), including penalties for non-compliance and the creation of a new regulatory office with broad discretion over CSO activities. These measures, which include vague restrictions on the activities of CSOs, disproportionately affect vulnerable groups such as women, youth, and people with disabilities who rely heavily on CSOs for advocacy and access to basic fundamental rights. The law’s broad and undefined terms threaten international human rights standards, including freedoms of association, assembly, and expression, and undermine Zimbabwe’s international and regional legal commitments. While the City Bar acknowledges the importance of promoting transparency in civic space, it urges that any regulations must be carefully reviewed to ensure they do not impede on fundamental freedoms or enable arbitrary suppression of dissent.
STATEMENT
STATEMENT EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER NEW LAW IN ZIMBABWE IMPOSING RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
The New York City Bar Association[1] expresses concern over the Private Voluntary Organisations (PVO) Amendment Act[2], signed into law by Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa on April 11, 2025. The new law allows the government to cancel or refuse registration of civil society organizations (CSOs); imposes penalties for failure to register, including fines and imprisonment; establishes a new Office of the Registrar with oversight over the registration process; and imposes restrictions on the activities that CSOs can engage in. These measures threaten the rule of law and fundamental rights under international and regional human rights law, including freedom of association and assembly and freedom of expression. It also disproportionately impacts marginalized and vulnerable groups and the capacity for CSOs to provide essential services and advocate for groups, including women, youth, and persons with disabilities—communities that often rely heavily on CSOs for representation and access to fundamental rights. These sweeping limitations will not only stifle the voices of these vulnerable populations but also exacerbate existing social inequalities and systemic discrimination, reinforcing barriers to inclusion and deepening social harm. The New York City Bar Association is committed to the protection of fundamental human rights and civil society organizations and acknowledges the importance of promoting transparency and accountability in civic space. However, any regulations must be carefully reviewed to ensure they serve legitimate purposes and adhere to international and regional standards regarding freedom of association and expression. The enactment of this law marks a grave assault on civic space, democratic freedoms, and Zimbabwe’s international and regional legal obligations.
The New York City Bar Association calls on the Government of Zimbabwe to immediately repeal the law and undertake a genuine, consultative reform of the regulatory framework governing civil society in line with constitutional and international human rights standards.
I. BACKGROUND
The PVO Amendment Act, initially tabled in 2021, purportedly aims to curb money laundering and the financing of terrorism[3]. However, national[4] and international[5] civil society actors, legal experts, and United Nations experts[6] have consistently raised concerns that the law is designed to restrict the operations of CSO’s especially those working on governance, human rights, and electoral transparency.
In January 2023, Zimbabwean authorities announced that they had revoked the registration of 291 non-governmental and civil society organizations for “noncompliance” with the provisions of the Private Voluntary Organization Act.[7]
In 2024, Zimbabwe’s Parliament passed the PVO Amendment Bill. Despite further objections raised by civil society actors, on April 11, 2025, the president of Zimbabwe signed into law the Private Voluntary Organizations Amendment Act, which amended the PVO Act as well as related Acts on Money Laundering, Criminal Matters, and National Security.
II. THE PVO AMENDMENT ACT
The following section describes some of the key elements of the PVO Amendment Act that raise concerns:
Registration requirements
The Act expands the definition of PVOs to include trusts, universitas (voluntary associations), legal persons, and legal arrangements and mandates new rules on the registration of PVOs with the Office of the Registrar, a new entity established by the Act. It requires organizations to pay an application fee to register and provide stringent details, including funding sources and addresses of promoters. As part of the application process, a PVO must also publish in a local paper, at its own expense, a notice calling for individuals to lodge any objections to the organization’s registration with the Regisrar of PVOs within a prescribed time limit. It imposes criminal sanctions for certain acts and inactions, makes it illegal for organizations to operate without registration, and introduces civil penalty orders for violations of some of the Act’s provisions. PVOs must now apply to amend their registration when there is any “material change[8] exposing the PVO to additional review, delays, and possible refusal.
Rules governing the conduct of PVOs
The Act outlines several principles which PVOs are required to follow, including being “sensitive to the cultural values and norms of the community in the area where it [the PVO] primarily operates.” It also prohibits support to political parties and includes many vague terms that could encompass legitimate human rights advocacy, governance-related work, and free participation in activities relating to electoral processes.[9] The use of ambiguous terms like “political activities” without defining them could lead to arbitrary enforcement and potentially criminalize legitimate human rights and governance work by civil society organizations.
Office of the Registrar and amendments to the PVO Board
The Office of the Registrar possesses broad discretionary powers, including evaluation and determination of applications for registration and maintaining the Register of PVOs. The PVO law also establishes a PVO Board, a body comprising representatives from civil society and several government ministries, to oversee regulation and compliance. The Board’s responsibilities include assessing and approving or declining provisional registrations and cancellations, advising relevant government officials and registered PVOs, and submitting an annual report. There are no set criteria for oversight of the board or clear pathways for judicial challenges to the board’s decisions or effective remedies. The Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare may designate PVOs as “high risk” as part of Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) practices and impose additional registration and compliance obligations, including detailed beneficial ownership disclosures. In some instances, the Act will require an organization to provide information about its “beneficial owner” or “controller” to the Office of the Registrar. It allows the registrar to scrutinize the ownership structures, funding sources, affiliations, and operations of PVOs. The Minister can suspend trustees suspected of illegal acts or misconduct and appoint provisional trustees whose salaries are paid from the PVO’s resources.
III. CONCERNS RAISED BY CIVIL SOCIETY OVER CIVIC SPACE RESTRICTIONS
The new law has been criticized by international organizations like Human Rights Watch[10] and United Nations experts, including the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and freedom of opinion and expression cautioned about risks if the bill were passed into law. They warned that “the restrictions contained therein will have a chilling effect on civil society organizations, particularly dissenting voices.”[11] Following the adoption of the law, the European Union[12] announced it would suspend funding for good governance initiatives in Zimbabwe in 2025.
The Zimbabwe Human Rights Association and The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (FIDH-OMCT) noted additional concerns related to the various laws amended by the PVO Amendment Act. They stated, “…additionally, the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] was amended to criminalise any actions or speech deemed to undermine the dignity and sovereignty of Zimbabwe, creating an environment where dissent and criticism of the government can be prosecuted. The Cyber and Data Protection Act [Chapter 12:07] raises concerns regarding potential surveillance of online activities, which could target activists and curtail digital dissent. Collectively, these laws foster an environment of fear and repression, making it increasingly difficult for civil society, human rights organisations, and citizens to engage in political discourse, protest, and advocacy for democratic rights and freedoms.”[13]
In condemning the bill, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) stated that the “PVO Amendment Bill contravenes Zimbabwe’s international obligations regarding the right to freedom of association. It completely and wantonly disregards the provisions on association enunciated in the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights’ Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa. The Bill strikes at the heart of civil society’s ability to operate freely and effectively.”[14]
The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) commented that, “The amendments to the PVO Act outline principles that organizations are required to consider, without indicating how these will be enforced…It will be difficult for PVOs to predict what types of conduct might violate these principles. This likely violates the “prescribed by law” test under international law, which requires that any restriction on the freedom of association be sufficiently precise to enable an individual or organization to assess whether their intended conduct would be in breach of the law, and to foresee the likely consequences of any such breach.”[15]
Regarding the Office of the Registrar, the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association stated, “[a]ny decision rejecting the submission or application must be clearly motivated and duly communicated in writing to the applicant. Associations whose submissions or applications have been rejected should have the opportunity to challenge the decision before an independent and impartial court.”[16]
In a letter addressed to the President of Zimbabwe dated December 17, 2021, four U.N. Special Rapporteurs – the Special Rapporteurs on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the situation of human rights defenders, and the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism – warned that the PVO bill, if signed into law, will have grave consequences for the exercise of civil and political rights, including the right to freedom of association. They reminded the government that The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) sets international standards to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, including through non-binding recommendations like Recommendation 8. This guidance urges states to enact targeted, proportionate measures to address the subset of CSOs genuinely vulnerable to terrorist financing, avoiding a “one size fits all” approach, and counter-terrorism regulations should not be weaponized to suppress legitimate civil society activity[17] “FATF has reaffirmed that State compliance with Recommendation 8 should be implemented ‘in a manner which respects countries obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international human rights law,’ including the State obligation to promote universal respect for, and observance of, fundamental human rights and freedoms, such as freedom of expression, religion or belief and freedom of peaceful assembly and of association.”
IV. POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The PVO Amendment Act raises serious concerns regarding the disproportionate restrictions imposed on civic space, the rule of law, and the exercise of fundamental rights in Zimbabwe.
As the New York City Bar Association noted in a March 2024 statement expressing concern about similar legislation to regulate non-profit organizations in Paraguay[18] and an April 2025 statement on similar legislation in Peru[19], the PVO Amendment Act could potentially violate a number of international human rights laws and standards. As detailed below, several provisions of the Act risk violating the rights to access justice, free association, and free expression, disproportionately affecting marginalized and vulnerable populations.
A. Freedom of Association
The right to freedom of association, as guaranteed by article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and article 10 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), guarantees the right to form and join formal and informal groups, including non-profit organizations. Under these international treaties, States must abstain from unduly obstructing this right and take measures to establish and maintain a safe and enabling environment for associations to function and to respect their privacy and that of their members. A Member State of the African Union and the United Nations, Zimbabwe has ratified both of these international human rights treaties. Additionally, Section 58 of Zimbabwe’s Constitution[20] recognizes the right to freedom of assembly and association.
The ICCPR and ACHPR provide a limited scope by which States may restrict the freedom of association. Article 22.2 of the ICCPR states that “no restrictions may be placed on the exercise of [the freedom of association] other than those which are prescribed by law, and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” The ACHPR exclusively allows for the same restrictions on freedom of association.[21]
The Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Paragraph 11, states that “States shall not compel associations to register in order to be allowed to exist and to operate freely. Informal (de facto) associations shall not be punished or criminalized under the law or in practice on the basis of their lack of formal (de jure) status.” Paragraph 13 of the Guidelines also states that “Registration procedures shall be simple, clear, non-discriminatory and nonburdensome, without discretionary components. Should the law authorize the registration authorities to reject applications, it must do so on the basis of a limited number of clear legal grounds, in compliance with regional and international human rights law.”
The U.N. Human Rights Committee[22] has consistently affirmed in its jurisprudence and guidance that “a restriction on the right to freedom of association can be justified only if it cumulatively meets” the conditions set out in ICCPR article 22.2 and is proportionate in nature.[23] Therefore, restrictions must (1) be provided for by law, (2) address a clear purpose set out in article 22.2, and (3) be “necessary in a democratic society.”[24] Similarly, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders has emphasized that “States should always be guided by the principle that the restrictions must not impair the essence of the right.”[25] In this sense, the ability of organizations to operate for lawful aims must prevail over non-essential restrictions. The Act fails to meet several of these conditions.
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- Provided for by the law
As noted above, any restriction on the freedom of association must be outlined in a “duly promulgated law, regulation, decree, order, or decision of an adjudicative body.“[26] Additionally, the content of the restriction must be clearly enunciated to be considered “prescribed.“[27]
The language of the Act fails to clearly define several key elements, including specifying which conduct by PVOs would violate the established principles, and a definition of actions that are or are not “sensitive to the cultural values and norms of the community.” These principles therefore lack the clarity and precision required to be considered “provided for by law” under Article 22.2 of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the ACHPR and are not sufficiently precise to enable organizations to assess whether specific conduct might constitute a violation. These ambiguous terms also grant excessive discretion to the new Office of the Registrar to determine when a PVO’s activities violate the law, creating legal uncertainty and enabling arbitrary enforcement.
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- In the interest of a clear purpose
A restriction must fall under one of the permitted purposes under ICCPR article 22.2, including, as mentioned above, an interest in national security or public order, protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
It is clear that the restrictions imposed by the Act do not pursue a legitimate purpose recognized under Article 22.2 of the ICCPR. The law’s vague language opens the door to arbitrary interpretation and targeted application, allowing the government to justify restrictions on civil society activities that are critical of state policies, advocate for good governance practices and electoral integrity, or engage in political discourse. As written, the Act fails to establish a clear, legitimate purpose under ICCPR standards and instead risks being used to suppress dissent and limit the role of civil society in holding the State accountable.
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- Necessary in a democratic society
The U.N Human Rights Committee has explained that the notion of a “democratic society” means a society where associations may “peacefully promote ideas not necessarily favorably received by the government or the majority of the population.“[28] Restrictions must respect freedom of expression and not be used to suppress dissent. Furthermore, for a restriction to be “necessary in a democratic society” (emphasis added), the restriction must be proportionate to its objective.
The Act fails to demonstrate that the restrictions imposed on civil society organizations are necessary in a democratic society. Instead of being narrowly tailored to achieve a legitimate aim, the law imposes arbitrary and burdensome restrictions that undermine the ability of civil society to operate freely.
B. Internal Affairs of Organizations
Many of the Act’s provisions negate PVOs’ ability to function independently and free from government interference.
Independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of organizations are essential elements for the full realization of freedom of association. The Human Rights Council recognized this principle in a resolution, stating that “reporting requirements placed on individuals, groups and organs of society [should] not inhibit functional autonomy.“[29] The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa provides that “Associations shall be self-governing and free to determine their internal management structures, rules for selecting governing officers, internal accountability mechanisms and other internal governance matters.“[30]
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association has observed that governments often use “extensive scrutiny over the internal affairs of associations, as a way of intimidation and harassment.”[31] The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders echoed these observations, saying that “States should not interfere with the internal management and activities of NGOs.”[32] Excessive State monitoring and internal interference suppress critical voices and weaken democratic debate.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, alongside other Special Rapporteurs, have repeatedly expressed that organizations must be allowed to conduct their activities freely, including determining their internal governance and activities,[33] and should be free from undue interference In response to concerns over similar bills in other countries, the U.N. Special Rapporteurs have noted that under the ICCPR States have a positive obligation to establish and maintain an enabling environment[34] for the full realization of freedom of association.
C. Violation of Right to Freedom of Speech and Free Participation in Political Activities
Article 19 of the ICCPR guarantees the right to freedom of expression, including political speech, stating that “…this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” ICCPR Article 19 (2) provides that “…this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” The U.N. Human Rights Council, in its Resolution 12/16 noting ICCPR Article 19, called on States to refrain from imposing restriction which are not consistent with Article 19 “discussion of government policies and political debate; reporting on human rights, government activities and corruption in government; engaging in election campaigns, peaceful demonstrations or political activities, including for peace or democracy; and expression of opinion and dissent, religion or belief, including by persons belonging to minorities or vulnerable groups.”[35]
In its General Comment No.34 on ICCPR Article 19, the U.N. Human Rights Committee notes that States may not invoke national security, public order, or public health to justify the “muzzling of any advocacy of multi-party democracy, democratic tenets and human rights.” [36]
ICCPR Article 25 protects the right to participate in public affairs, including through civil society.
Article 9 of the ACHPR protects the right to express and disseminate opinions, and Article 13 guarantees the right of every citizen to participate freely in government affairs.
Article 12 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) requires states to “create conducive conditions for civil society organizations to exist and operate within the law.”[37]
Section 67 of Zimbabwe’s Constitution guarantees the freedom to participate in political activities.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association has clearly stated that civil society organizations have the right to participate in electoral processes. This includes advocating for reforms, discussing public issues, monitoring elections, conducting surveys, and engaging in voter education. While some regulation of campaign financing is necessary, any restrictions on civil society support for political candidates should focus on transparency rather than prohibition. Civil society organizations are vital in elections and democracy, as they advocate for their beneficiaries, promote political participation, public debate, facilitate voter education, ensure electoral integrity, support democratic principles and standards of good governance, and hold authorities accountable.[38]
V. NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION CALLS ON THE PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE TO PROTECT CIVIC SPACE
The restrictions in Zimbabwe’s new Private Voluntary Organizations Amendment Act pose serious challenges to the rule of law, civic space, and fundamental rights and principles under international law, including the right to freedom of association and assembly and freedom of expression.
The New York City Bar Association strongly urges Zimbabwean authorities to review the Act considering the protections outlined under regional and international law, and to initiate a dialogue aimed at adopting new regulations that ensure transparency and fundamental rights. The City Bar encourages Zimbabwean authorities to refrain from imposing burdensome requirements on civil society organizations that infringe on the rights of victims of human rights violations to access justice, endanger human rights defenders, and limit civic space. Civil society organizations play a vital role in a democratic society and must be protected.
Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice
Adaobi Egboka, Africa Program Director and Member, African Affairs Committee and International Human Rights Committee
African Affairs Committee
Melissa Verpile, Chair
International Human Rights Committee
Suchitra Vijayan, Chair
Council on International Affairs
Peggy McGuinness, Chair
June 2025
Footnotes
[1] The New York City Bar Association (City Bar), founded in 1870, is an organization of approximately 23,000 members in New York City and elsewhere throughout the United States and in more than 50 countries around the globe. Its members include judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, government lawyers, and public interest/non-governmental organization practitioners, as well as legal academics and attorneys representing nearly every major law firm and corporation in the United States. The City Bar has a long and distinguished history of promoting the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of legal professionals to fulfill their professional obligations. The Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice assisted with this Statement
[2] Private Voluntary Organisations Amendment Act, 2025, Act 1 of 2025. Available: https://zimlii.org/akn/zw/act/2025/1/eng@2025-04-11 (All websites last accessed on June 2, 2025).
[3] Bill Watch 09-2024 – PVO Bill and FATF Recommendations. Available: https://www.veritaszim.net/node/6920.
[4] “We are coming after them” The State of Civic Space in Zimbabwe. December 2024. See, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/2024_state_of_civic_space_report_expanded_version.pdf.
[5] Zimbabwe: President Mnangagwa must reject proposed new law that threatens rights and civic space- available https://www.amnesty.org.zw/2023/02/zimbabwe-president-mnangagwa-must-reject-proposed-new-law-that-threatens-rights-and-civic-space/.
[6] UN experts urge President of Zimbabwe to reject bill restricting civic space, 14 February, 2023- https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/un-experts-urge-president-zimbabwe-reject-bill-restricting-civic-space.
[7] 291 NGOs fail to comply with regulations. Available: https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/291-ngos-fail-to-comply-with-regulations/.
[8] PVO Amendment Act, Section 7 (inserting new Section 13A into the PVO Act).
[9] (Section 9 of the Amendment Act inserting a new Section 20A into the Act) and (Section 11, Amendment of section 23 of Cap. 17:05)
[10] Zimbabwe: President Signs Law to Curb Civic Space. Available on https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/04/17/zimbabwe-president-signs-law-curb-civic-space.
[11] UN experts urge President of Zimbabwe to reject bill restricting civic space 14 February 2023. Available: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/un-experts-urge-president-zimbabwe-reject-bill-restricting-civic-space.
[12] https://x.com/vonKirchmannEU/status/1911046833230487808.
[13] “We are coming after them” The State of Civic Space in Zimbabwe. December 2024. See, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/2024_state_of_civic_space_report_expanded_version.pdf.
[14] Zimbabwe: Rights Lawyers Condemn Passing of ‘Repressive Pvo Bill’ in Senate Without a Debate. Available: https://allafrica.com/stories/202410250047.html.
[15] The Zimbabwe’s Private Voluntary Organisations Act – Incorporating 2025 Amendments: Understanding the Implications for PVOs, page 15. Available at https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Zimbabwe-PVO-amendment-act-guide-updated-April-2025-final.pdf.
[16] (A/HRC/20/27, para.61. Available: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-27_en.pdf.
[17] S/RES/2462(2019)
[18] https://www.nycbar.org/reports/statement-expressing-concern-over-the-new-peruvian-law-restricting-civil-society-organizations.
[19] https://www.nycbar.org/reports/statement-expressing-concern-over-the-new-peruvian-law-restricting-civil-society-organizations.
[20] The Constitution of Zimbabwe. Available: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013.
[21] United Nations Human Rights Committee, established under Article 28 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights.
[22] Human Rights Committee, Romanovsky v. Belarus, Communication No. 2011/2010, 7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/115/D/2011/2010 (December 7, 2015). See also Joint Letter of U.N. Special Rapporteurs, supra, at p. 5: “States should ensure that any restrictions on the right of civil society organizations to access funding and resources comply with the international human rights requirements of legality, legitimate aim, necessity and proportionality in a democratic society, as set out in Article 22(2) of the ICCPR.
[23] European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Joint Opinion on Draft Law No. 6674 on introducing changes to some legislative acts to ensure public transparency of information on finance activity of public associations and of the use of international technical assistance, and on Draft Law No. 6675 on introducing changes to the tax code of Ukraine to ensure public transparency of the financing of public associations and of the use of international technical assistance, 34, VC Opinion No. 912/2018, OSCE/ODIHR Opinion No. NGO-UKR/321/2018 (March 16, 2018).
[24] Maina Kiai, Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Report on the Right to Freedom of Association, 16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/27 (May 21, 2012).
[25] Margaret Sekaggya, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Report on the Right to Freedom of Association, the Content of the Right and Its Implementation in Practice, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. A/64/226 (August 4, 2009).
[26] David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Rep. on his mission to Tajikistan, ¶ 82, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/22/Add.2 (13 Oct. 2017); Margaret Sekaggya (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders), Rep. on the use of legislation to regulate the activities of human rights defenders, ¶ 86, U.N. Doc. A/67/292 (10 Aug. 2012).
[27] Joint Letter of U.N. Special Rapporteurs, supra, at p. 5.
[28] Margaret Sekaggya (Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders), Rep. on the use of legislation to regulate the activities of human rights defenders, ¶¶ 70-71, U.N. Doc. A/67/292 (10 Aug. 2012).
[29] Maina Kiai (Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association), 38, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (24 Apr. 2013).
[30] (ACHPR Guidelines, para. 36) – The ACHPR Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa are a set of guidelines -, soft law- published by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) to promote and protect these fundamental rights across the continent. Available: https://achpr.au.int/index.php/en/soft-law/guidelines-freedom-association-and-assembly-africa.
[31] Margaret Sekaggya (Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders), Rep. on the right to freedom of association, the content of the right and its implementation in practice, 121, U.N. Doc. A/64/226 (4 Aug. 2009).
[32] Joint Letter of U.N. Special Rapporteurs, supra, at p. 2.
[33] Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief; and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Communication to the Republic of Indonesia, pp. 3-4. IDN 11/2012 (31 Aug. 2012).
[34] G.A. Res. 53/144, U.N. Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, art. 13 (8 Mar. 1999) (“Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to solicit, receive and utilize resources for the express purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms through peaceful means.”).See also Margaret Sekaggya (Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders), Rep. on the right to freedom of association, the content of the right and its implementation in practice, 91, U.N. Doc. A/64/226 (4 Aug. 2009) (“Access to funding, the ability of human rights organizations to solicit, receive and use funding, is an inherent element of the right to freedom of association. In order for human rights organizations to be able to carry out their activities, it is indispensable that they are able to discharge their functions without any impediments, including funding restrictions.”).
[35] RES/12/16- Freedom of Opinion and expression. Available: https://www.right-docs.org/doc/a-hrc-res-12-16/#:~:text=(j)%20Consistent%20with%20their%20human,the%20gravity%20of%20the%20offence.
[36] CCPR/C/GC/34 – https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/general-comments-and-recommendations/general-comment-no34-article-19-freedoms-opinion-and.
[37] https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36384-treaty-african-charter-on-democracy-and-governance.pdf.
[38] United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of peaceful assembly and of association, U.N. Doc. A/68/299 (2013), Section B.