Committee Reports

Opposition to the Internal Revenue Service Proposed Rule on Racial Nondiscrimination in Private Schools

SUMMARY

In November 2026, the New York City Bar Association submitted comments opposing the Internal Revenue Service’s proposed rule on racial nondiscrimination in private schools (26 CFR Part 1, REG-119986-25, RIN 1545-BS05). The City Bar argues that the proposal is contrary to law, lacks clear standards for compliance, and would undermine longstanding efforts to promote equal educational opportunity.

The comment contends that the proposed rule would eliminate existing Internal Revenue Service safe-harbor provisions allowing certain race-conscious programs designed to advance nondiscrimination and diversity in private schools. According to the City Bar, the proposal extends far beyond the Supreme Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions and would jeopardize educational, scholarship, and outreach programs intended to address historic barriers to educational access. The comment concludes that the rule should be withdrawn because it conflicts with established law and would create significant practical burdens for schools, donors, and courts.

  • Conflicts with existing charitable-law principles. The comment argues that the proposal is inconsistent with the charitable-purpose framework underlying Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) and with precedent recognizing efforts to combat discrimination as charitable activity.
  • Exceeds the scope of existing precedent. The City Bar contends that the proposal expands beyond the holdings of Students for Fair Admissions by applying restrictions across all areas of private-school operations rather than higher-education admissions alone.
  • Fails Administrative Procedure Act requirements. The comment argues that the Internal Revenue Service does not adequately explain its departure from prior policy or justify eliminating longstanding safe-harbor provisions for diversity-oriented programs and financial aid.
  • Creates uncertainty and enforcement concerns. According to the comment, the proposal does not clearly define prohibited conduct or explain how compliance would be assessed, creating the risk of inconsistent enforcement and uncertainty for tax-exempt institutions.
  • Would burden educational institutions and courts. The comment states that schools could face significant legal and administrative costs, including court proceedings to modify donor-restricted funds supporting race-conscious programs, potentially increasing demands on state court systems.

RULE INFORMATION

Proposed Internal revenue Service Rule Concerning Nondiscrimination in Private Schools (26 CFR Part 1, REG-119986-25, RIN 1545-BS05)

REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

The New York City Bar Association (“City Bar”) submits this comment in response to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) proposed rule concerning nondiscrimination in private schools (the “Proposed Rule”).[1] The Proposed Rule is contrary to law and does not provide a clear standard for schools to follow, and will unnecessarily burden private institutions and donors trying to follow existing law and provide for all students, including students historically barred from equal access to education. The City Bar opposes adoption of the Proposed Rule.

By warping the meaning of “nondiscrimination”, the Proposed Rule thwarts decades of precedent providing protections to Black students and other students of color.[2] The Proposed Rule follows in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Students For Fair Admissions v. Harvard and SFFA v. University of North Carolina (collectively “SFFA”), which held that Harvard’s and UNC’s race-conscious college admissions policies violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI.[3] Notably, that ruling still allows colleges to consider how race has affected a student’s life and their ability to contribute to the educational institution. As discussed below, the Proposed Rule goes well beyond the holding in SFFA, expanding beyond higher education admissions to all areas of private school education. Further, the Proposed Rule runs contrary to the definition of charitability, the Administrative Procedure Act, First Amendment, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as applied to private schools receiving federal funding).

II. REGULATORY HISTORY AND THE PROPOSED RULE

Following Brown v. Board and the national movement to end racial segregation in schools, the federal government adopted a regulatory framework to encourage school integration. This included incentives in the tax code that allowed private schools to qualify for tax-exempt status under IRS code 501(c)(3) so long as they operated under racial nondiscrimination policies.[4] Regulations § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2)(ii) and rulings from the IRS codify this exempt purpose.

Private institutions that seek to maintain tax-exempt status under section 501(a) of the Code “must be both organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes set forth in section 501(c)(3) of the Code. If an organization fails to meet either the organizational test or the operational test, it is not exempt. The IRS recognizes the “eliminat[ion] of prejudice and discrimination” as a charitable exempt purpose in accordance with section 501(c)(3) for purposes of the organizational test and programmatic activities that combat discrimination as satisfying the operational test.[5]

IRS Revenue Procedure 75-50 sets forth additional guidelines for determining exemption under section 501(c)(3). Rev. Proc. 75-50 requires private schools to adopt and legitimately operate under a policy that prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, which the IRS defines as on the basis of color and national or ethnic origin.[6] This procedure also requires that private schools document and report on the existence of and compliance with racial nondiscrimination policies.[7] Plainly, these policies, which were adopted in the wake of racial segregation were meant to encourage schools to maintain programs that did not exclude Black students from school life.

As such, Rev. Proc. 75-50 contains an exemption for race-conscious programs adopted in the service of encouraging non-discrimination and balanced diversity in private schools. The provisions, commonly known as the “safe harbor” provisions, are found in two subsections of Rev. Proc. 75-50, the second sentence of §3.02, which reads:

“A policy of a school that favors racial minority groups with respect to admissions, facilities and programs, and financial assistance will not constitute discrimination on the basis of race when the purpose and effect is to promote the establishment and maintenance of that school’s racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students.”[8]

And the third and fourth sentences of §4.05, which provide:

“Consistent with section 3.02, supra, scholarships and loans that are made pursuant to financial assistance programs favoring members of one or more racial minority groups that are designed to promote a school’s racially nondiscriminatory policy will not adversely affect the school’s exempt status. Financial assistance programs favoring members of one or more racial groups that do not significantly derogate from the school’s racially nondiscriminatory policy similarly will not adversely affect the school’s exempt status.”

The Proposed Rule seeks to eliminate these safe harbor provisions from Rev. Proc. 75-50. The Proposed Rule’s preamble also explicitly states that this provision would not prevent private schools from maintaining programs or admissions criteria based on religious affiliation.

Additionally, the Proposed Rule would add a new § 1.501(c)(3)-2 to the Regulations further clarifying that a private school organized and operated exclusively for tax-exempt purposes is not considered to be operated exclusively for exempt purposes if it “adopts, maintains, or enforces any policy or practice that discriminates on the basis of race, color, or national or ethnic origin in the administration of any educational policy, admissions policy, scholarship or loan program, athletic program, or other school-administered or school-supported program.” Proposed Rule § 1.501(c)(3)-2(b).

In effect, if finalized, the Proposed Rule would allow the IRS to revoke the tax-exempt status of any school that implicates race in any of its programs, even if those programs are tailored to combat racial discrimination in admissions and other activities.[9]

III. THE PROPOSED RULE IS CONTRARY TO LAW

a. The Proposed Rule is Inconsistent with Bob Jones and the Common Law Charity Standard

The Proposed Rule disregards the charitability standard used to prescribe tax exemption based on section 501(c)(3) of the Code, as the rule prohibits actions that are not contrary to settled public policy. Under the common law charity standard, adopted in the Internal Revenue Code and IRS guidance, “an institution must show, first, that it falls within one of the eight categories expressly set forth in that section, and second, that its activity is not contrary to settled public policy.”[10] Private schools satisfy the first prong as corporations are organized and operated for charitable and educational purposes.

Bob Jones establishes racial nondiscrimination as settled public policy under the second prong, making schools with discriminatory policies ineligible for section 501(c)(3) exempt status. In that matter, Bob Jones University sought to preserve its prohibition on interracial dating, which expelled students who engaged in interracial dating and denied admission to applicants in interracial marriages or who advocated for interracial dating or marriage.[11] The Supreme Court held that the IRS acted within its statutory authority in revoking tax-exempt status from the university because of its discriminatory policy.

The Proposed Rule tries to mirror Bob Jones, citing “the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Supreme Court case law such as Brown to Runyon to Bob Jones to SFFA and the actions taken by the Executive Branch” as evidence of a settled public policy against discrimination. See, e.g., Executive Order 10730 (22 FR 7628; Sep. 24, 1957). However, apart from the recent SFFA decision, which only applied to higher education admissions, these other landmark events seek to eliminate vestiges of slavery and afford equal access to Black Americans. From Bob Jones: “the Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education — discrimination that prevailed, with official approval, for the first 165 years of this Nation’s [constitutional] history.”[12] The Proposed Rule reverses this effort, ignoring longstanding inequities in access to education in favor of supposed colorblindness.

In sum, the Trump Administration’s conception of nondiscrimination set forth in the Proposed Rule is not settled public policy and thus fails to meet the second prong of the charity standard. The Proposed Rule breaks from longstanding consensus on what discrimination is and what has been permitted under IRS rules. Even after SFFA, schools can still consider race to promote diversity within their student body so long as it does not result in differential treatment.[13] Such practices include, but are not limited to, recruitment efforts in under-represented communities and consideration of a student’s lived experiences.[14]  The IRS cannot masquerade its partisan belief as settled public policy when it runs contrary to public understanding and practice.[15]

b. The Proposed Rule is Arbitrary and Capricious Under the Administrative Procedure Act, as it Fails to Show Either Awareness of a Changed Position or Good Reason for Such Position

The Proposed Rule is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).  The APA requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be … arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law,” or decisions made “without observance of procedure required by law.”[16] Courts do not defer to an agency’s interpretation of the law and must exercise “independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority.”[17]

An agency is required to “display awareness that it is changing position” and “show that there are good reasons” for its new policy.[18] For the first prong, the IRS does not make clear whether the Proposed Rule is meant to break from current legal guidance or merely restate existing law. In one section, the Proposed Rule states that the proposed regulations “would provide that all forms of racial discrimination in education” are against public policy, “regardless of … the legality of such discrimination (for example, where such discrimination is defended as serving remedial or diversity-related objectives),” apparently seeking to supplement the law with its own viewpoint.[19] In another, the Proposed Rule seeks to “clarify the law applicable to qualification for the Federal tax exemption of private schools[,] … eliminate ambiguity and ensure consistent application across all private schools.”[20] In actuality, the Proposed Rule goes beyond existing case law and regulations by disallowing any consideration of race in all aspects of private education. It also changes existing IRS policy; as previously mentioned, under Rev. Proc. 75-50, “scholarships and loans that are made pursuant to financial assistance programs favoring members of one or more racial minority groups that are designed to promote a school’s racially nondiscriminatory policy will not adversely affect the school’s exempt status.”[21] Under the Proposed Rule, these same remedial programs would now disqualify schools from federal tax exemptions.

For the second prong, the Proposed Rule does not state good reasons for enforcement. In its “Need for Regulation” section, the IRS cites “recent developments in the law,” presumably the SFFA decision, but does not include any reason for the IRS to regulate beyond such law, by surpassing SFFA’s holding on higher education admissions to include all instances of race-consciousness in private school education. As such, the regulation is arbitrary and capricious, and invalid as written under the APA.

c. The Proposed Rule Does Not Sufficiently Define What is Considered Discrimination

The Proposed Rule does not sufficiently define what is considered discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national or ethnic origin, particularly in a regulation that potentially regulates beyond existing settled nondiscrimination policy and practice. Merely reiterating that its conception of racial discrimination is against public policy does not provide a normative standard of what is prohibited for schools to abide by.[22] This is especially the case when pertaining to practices aimed to “ameliorate the effects of past discrimination,” which the IRS now states could itself be considered discrimination.

The Proposed Rule will harm students in need and further encumber private institutions due to the vagueness of its requirements. The Supreme Court has long recognized the particular importance of clarity in rules governing taxation.  In Gould v. Gould the Court stated:

In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen.[23]

The importance of predictability and clarity is even greater when the issue concerns an entity’s tax status, rather than simply the calculation of taxes in a particular year.  Loss of 501(c)(3) status would throw the vast majority of qualifying entities into existential crises.  Given the stakes as well as the fact that the public policy exception to 501(c)(3) is potentially so broad and amorphous, it is imperative that the exception be confined to situations where the public policy at issue is clear.  The proposed regulation fails to do so.

Because of the vagueness of the Proposed Rule, there is great risk of arbitrary enforcement among private schools. When both “discrimination” and ameliorating discrimination are suspect, viewpoint-neutral application becomes impracticable. The Proposed Rule would effectively allow the IRS to deny federal tax privileges according to its own ideological whims, undermining the purpose of the section 501(c)(3) charitable exemption. Schools will be unable to predict what practices are disqualifying, given that no parameters have been provided, threatening existing services for underserved students that simply mention race, color, or national or ethnic origin.

Further, the Proposed Rule is silent on how the IRS will evaluate compliance with the regulation and provides no information as to how a private institution can prove its compliance if ever audited by the IRS. The Proposed Rule requests capitulation to its directive without any policy reasoning or procedural guidelines as to why or how private institutions are supposed to comply. This will further encumber private institutions unnecessarily.

d. The Proposed Rule Chills Speech in Violation of the First Amendment

Vagueness also poses crucial First Amendment concerns, chilling speech and expression in private schools and for their donors. The language of the Proposed Rule is seemingly boundless, covering any distinction of race, color, or national or ethnic origin in all areas of education, even if for educational and charitable purposes. According to Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2), charitability expressly includes the elimination of prejudice and discrimination, and many private institutions engage in a variety of race-conscious practices in furtherance of this charitable purpose. Yet the Proposed Rule’s nondescript use of the word “discrimination” would deny section 501(c)(3) exemption to private schools engaging in otherwise lawful practices that are necessary to combat systemic exclusion for underserved students. When schools “fear that many activities central to their work, their missions, and their employment could jeopardize their federal funding,” there is injury in fact under the First Amendment.[24]

In addition, limiting donors’ ability to make race-conscious scholarship donations for members of protected classes to ameliorate past and present effects of discrimination in education and/or requiring schools to request revision of existing race-conscious gifts would infringe on donors’ First Amendment right to freedom of speech and association.[25] The Supreme Court has “long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others.”[26] The Supreme Court prohibits the government from infringing on this association.[27] In fact, the Supreme Court finds that such association is important public policy as it furthers “a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends,” and is “especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity.”[28] Furthermore, the Court has long recognized that the First Amendment’s speech and expression protections include monetary contributions: “[a] contribution constitutes a general expression of support,” and “the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.”[29] To safeguard the free exchange of ideas and promote political and social change, the Court has afforded such expression broad constitutional protection.[30] In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court extended these principles to associations that donate money, emphasizing that speech supported through financial contributions is entitled to protection in the marketplace of ideas.[31] Donors may wish to associate themselves with particular institutions and their charitable purposes through scholarships benefiting members of a protected class in recognition of systemic barriers to educational opportunity and the legacy of discrimination; the Proposed Rule would stifle donors’ First Amendment rights to engage in such activity.[32]

e. The Proposed Rule Prevents Private Schools Who Receive Federal Funding from Fully Enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Private schools that receive federal funding are bound by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which has served as the bedrock of equity and access in education. Title VI states that “no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”[33] By prohibiting private schools that receive federal funding from fully enforcing policies cognizant of gaps in access for Black students and other marginalized groups, the Proposed Rule, in essence, rewards schools that perpetuate racial discrimination with a tax exemption.

The Proposed Rule states that it “would not disturb the continued ability of an organization (including a private school) to take actions or adopt policies intended to eliminate prejudice and discrimination, consistent with existing § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2), provided the organization achieves these purposes by means other than actions or policies that discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national or ethnic origin.”[34] However, it is practically impossible to ameliorate racial segregation in schools without taking note of the race-based nature of the discrimination itself. While the IRS purports to be in line with Title VI, it goes further than courts’ interpretation of the statute even after SFFA; guidance issued by the Department of Education under the previous Administration stated: ‘“nothing in the SFFA decision prohibits institutions from continuing to seek the admissions and graduation of diverse student bodies, including along the lines of race and ethnicity, through means that do not afford individual applicants a preference on the basis of race in admissions decisions.”[35] Further, 34 C.F.R. § 100.5(i), a regulation implementing Title VI, provides examples of “circumstances [where] an applicant or recipient [of federal funds] may properly give special consideration to race, color, or national origin to make the benefits of its program more widely available to such groups [that are] not…being adequately served.”[36] In barring any consideration of race to advance educational equity, the Proposed Rule contradicts current interpretation of Title VI and perverts the legislative intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

IV. THE PROPOSED RULE WOULD UNNECESSARILY BURDEN COURTS AND CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS

As the preamble to the Proposed Rule points out, private schools are likely to incur legal and administrative costs to comply with the new restrictions promulgated by the IRS. Among these, private institutions will need to revise existing gifts restricted for use on race-conscious programmatic activities. Almost all states and the District of Columbia follow the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (“UPMIFA”), or a version of it such as the New York Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, which governs how nonprofit institutions invest and manage their endowment funds. Under UPMIFA, private institutions must request approval of changes to existing endowment funds’ purposes from the donor (if alive) in the first instance, or the courts and their state’s attorney general’s office if unable to reach the donor. When reviewing such petitions, courts are limited in discretion by the cy pres doctrine, which requires them to approve purpose restriction modifications only “in accordance with the donor’s probable intention” and “in a manner consistent with the charitable purposes expressed in the gift instrument.”[37] The IRS has recognized and honored the courts’ decisions using the cy pres doctrine in the past.[38]

If finalized as is, the Proposed Rule would require private institutions to seek court modification of race-based restrictions on an endowment fund whenever a donor is deceased and unable to grant approval of such modification. Petitions to modify gifts are lengthy, costly and do not guarantee modification by the court once the institution presents its request.  The recent protracted litigation involving a scholarship fund donated to the University of Iowa serves as a timely example.[39] The Proposed Rule would unnecessarily burden the courts due to the sudden influx of cy pres petitions requesting modification of endowment restrictions. The potential volume of such petitions received by the courts would also impede them from efficiently addressing cy pres and other matters and drain valuable resources in the state court system. Moreover, institutions awaiting court review would be forced to pause use of these endowment funds until (and if) a modification is granted. This would impact institutions’ ability to provide their educational programming and jeopardize their tax-exempt mission.

V. CONCLUSION

The New York City Bar Association opposes finalization of the Proposed Rule. The Proposed Rule is contrary to law and would negatively affect the nonprofit and education sectors at every level, violating constitutional rights, overwhelming the courts, catalyzing a chilling effect on philanthropy in education, and creating catastrophic consequences to students’ access to education across the United States. For the foregoing reasons, the Proposed Rule should be withdrawn.

Footnotes

[1] We would like to acknowledge and thank the following members for their contributions to the development of this public comment: Karen Enomoto, Paula Garcia-Salazar, and Ana Maria Maganto Ramirez.

[2] See e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483  (1954) (held that racial segregation in public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (held that private, commercially operated schools could not engage in racial discrimination under Section 1981); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (held that while race quotas are unconstitutional, race can be considered as one many factors to achieve diversity); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (held that the use of race as one factor in admissions did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (held that the use of race to automatically award points in admissions was not narrowly tailored, but upheld the use of  affirmative action to achieve the educational benefits of diversity); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 579 U.S. 365 (2016) (held that University of Texas race-conscious undergraduate admissions program satisfied strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause). See also IRS Rev Proc 75-50, § 3.02 and 4.05 (1975), discussed infra (permitting educational scholarships in favor of racial minority groups).

[3] Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181 (2023).

[4] Rev. Proc. 75-50

[5] IRS § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2)(ii).

[6] IRS Rev. Proc. 75-50 §3-02.

[7] Id. § 4.

[8] This subsection, as it relates to higher education admissions, is likely impacted by the SFFA decision.

[9] The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking itself makes clear the IRS’s expectation that virtually any race-conscious policy may jeopardize tax exempt status:

These proposed regulations would provide that all forms of racial discrimination in education, regardless of the intent behind or the legality of such discrimination (for example, where such discrimination is defended as serving remedial or diversity-related objectives), are against a fundamental public policy of the United States and thus preclude a school’s exemption from Federal income tax under section 501(c)(3). In so doing, the proposed regulations would make clear that discriminating based on race, color, or national or ethnic origin for any purpose by a private school is contrary to a fundamental public policy of the United States.

See Racial Nondiscrimination in Private Schools, 91 Fed. Reg. 56811 (proposed Sept. 4, 2026) (to be codified at 26 CFR pt. 1), https://www.regulations.gov/document/IRS-2026-1189-0001 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the proposed rule was issued in the wake of Executive Orders aimed at eliminating racial preferences and DEI programs, such that one could reasonably conclude that the IRS intends to apply the rule broadly to prohibit race-conscious admissions, scholarship, financial aid, and other school-administered programs regardless of whether such programs were adopted for diversity, remedial, or other purposes. See e.g., “Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity,” Jan. 21, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/ending-illegal-discrimination-and-restoring-merit-based-opportunity/; “Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing,” Jan. 20, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/ending-radical-and-wasteful-government-dei-programs-and-preferencing/ (All websites were last accessed on November 3, 2026).

[10]Bob Jones Univ. y v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585 (1983) (referencing § 170 and § 501(c)(3) of the IRC and Rev. Ruling 71-447).

[11] Id. at 580-81.

[12] Id. at 604.

[13] “The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that educational institutions can promote diversity using initiatives that are ‘race conscious but do not lead to different treatment’ based on that classification. In other words, no constitutional violation occurs if a policy merely ‘considers the impact that a given approach might have on students of different races” but does not discriminate on the basis of race.’” Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rts. Under Law, Urgent Call to Action: Lawful Practices That Colleges and Universities Should Take to Promote and Protect Diversity2026), https://www.lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Ugent-Call-to-Action-for-Colleges-LCCRUL-FINAL.pdf.

[14] See id.; NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., Affirmative Action in Higher Educ.: The Racial Justice Landscape after the SFFA Cases (Oct. 2023), https://www.advancingjustice-aajc.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/2023_09_29%20Report_0.pdf.

[15] Other interpretations of SFFA would, at a minimum, leave the law unsettled, and therefore an inappropriate basis on which to condition 501(c)(3) status.

[16] 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D).

[17] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024).

[18] Am. Fed’n of Tchrs. v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-00628-SAG, at 44 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2025) (quoting F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).

[19] Racial Nondiscrimination in Private Schools, 91 Fed. Reg. 56811 (proposed Sept. 4, 2026) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1), https://www.regulations.gov/document/IRS-2026-1189-0001.

[20] Id.

[21] Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587, § 4.05, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/rp1975-50.pdf.

[22] See Am. Fed’n of Tchrs., No. 1:25-cv-00628-SAG, at 65 (“Again, the government’s primary defense is that the Letter merely reiterates that discrimination is illegal. That defies logic… The Letter does not, despite the government’s assertions, provide any ‘comprehensible normative standard,’ even an ‘imprecise’ one, for regulated persons like Plaintiffs to understand what conduct it prohibits.”) (quoting Nat’l Urb. League v. Trump, No. 25-cv-471 (TJK), 2025 WL 1275613, at *19 (D.D.C. May 2, 2025)).

[23] Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917).

[24] Am. Fed’n of Tchrs., No. 1:25-cv-00628-SAG, at 25; see also Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 235 (4th Cir. 2013).

[25] See generally, N.Y. Att’y Gen. et al., Letter to Colleges, Universities, Private Foundations, and Scholarship Administrators Regarding Race-Conscious Scholarships (Aug. 13, 2025), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/2025-08/sffa-scholarship-multistate-guidance-letter.pdf.

[26] Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595 (2021) (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).

[27] Id. at 605-06.

[28] Id. at 606 (quoting Roberts, 594 U.S. at 622).

[29] Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).

[30]  Id. (quoting Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).

[31] See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

[32] See Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S.. at 609 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).

[33]42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2024).

[34] Racial Nondiscrimination in Private Schools, 91 Fed. Reg. 56811 (proposed Sept. 4, 2026) (to be codified at 26 CFR pt. 1), https://www.regulations.gov/document/IRS-2026-1189-0001.

[35] Am. Fed’n of Tchrs., No. 1:25-cv-00628-SAG, at 45. This guidance was removed by the current Administration sometime in Winter 2025.

[36] Id. at 38.

[37] UPMIFA § 6 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2006) (Unif. Prudent Mgmt. of Institutional Funds Act – Uniform Law Commission), UPMIFA_Final_2026may12.pdf.

[38] See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 32628 (July 29, 1963).

[39] In re Ezra L. Totton Scholarship, No. 25-0462 (Iowa 2026).